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In considering optimal securities regulatory structure, it is important to determine whether 
distinctive local and regional capital markets exist. If so, they should be taken into account.   
 
A capital market is comprised of issuers and investors. In respect of issuers, this study 
finds that local infrastructures for capital raising (LICRs) exist for certain industries and levels of 
market capitalization.  An LICR is defined as a geographic region where there is a critical mass 
of issuers of a certain industry type or level of market capitalization; this allows local securities 
regulators and professionals (such as investment bankers, lawyers and accountants) to develop 
an expertise and respond to the needs of such issuers.  
 
This study finds that Alberta hosts an LICR for oil and gas, B.C. hosts an LICR for 
micro-cap issuers, and Ontario hosts an LICR for financial services. Certain LICRs exist in more 
than one province:  Both B.C. and Ontario host LICRs for mining; Ontario, Quebec and B.C. for 
communications and media; Ontario and Quebec for life sciences; and B.C., Alberta and Ontario 
each host an LICR for small cap issuers.  
  
However, the existence of LICRs for certain industries does not allow us to conclude 
that the economic activity associated with these industries is local to host provinces or that host 
provinces have distinct local interests in the capital markets regulation or general regulation of 
those industries.  
 
The activities of issuers concentrated within an LICR have an impact outside the 
geographic boundaries of the province that hosts and regulates the LICR.  Other provinces may 
have an interest equal to that of the regulating province, given investor location and the 
importance of those industries to the economies of other provinces, as borne out by Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) data. 
 
Having found that LICRs for certain industries and levels of market capitalization exist in 
Canada, the issue that follows is whether provincial securities commissions that host an LICR 
identified in this study are responsive to that infrastructure in a manner that is different than other 
provincial securities commissions that do not host that LICR.  
 
Factors for determining whether a locally-developed policy is a response to distinctive 
local interests include the following: 
 
• Was the creation of the local policy followed by multilateral or national adoption by other 
provincial regulators?  If so, then the local policy may be an example of regulatory 
innovation supporting an argument for regulatory experimentation, but not an argument 
for local regulation of distinct local markets.  
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• Was the local policy created for the purpose of supporting an industry that is local to 
the province? If other provinces do not host the relevant industry in their geographical 
boundaries and are not interested in its development, then the local policy likely responds 
to a distinct local market. 
 
• Is the local policy’s application limited to issuers and investors that are all within the 
province? If investors are not located within the same province as the issuers to whom 
the policy applies, the local policy is not likely responding to a distinct local market. 
However, the fact that issuers and investors may be located in the same province is not 
determinative of whether the policy responds to distinctive local interests.   
 
• Can the underlying rationale of an industry-specific local policy be reasonably 
generalized such that its stated purpose is to allow issuers to raise capital with ease and 
without the costs associated with preparing a prospectus? If so, then the local interest 
loses its distinctiveness and the necessity for a local policy may be questionable; a more 
general national policy that is not industry-specific may serve the local interests.  
 
The Saskatchewan Community Venture Local Policy may be a legitimate example of 
a local policy serving distinct local needs and hence, supports the importance of provincial 
regulation of distinctive local and regional markets.  
 
However, most locally-developed policies and regulatory approaches examined in this 
study have experienced relatively rapid multilateral or national adoption.  In addition, most 
locally-developed policies studied in this report have been (a) in relation to industries that are 
national, not local, in character; (b) in response to concerns that are common to investors 
throughout the country; and (c) industry-neutral rules that allow issuers to raise capital in a cost-
effective manner.   
 
Overall, the analysis in this study finds that most local regulatory responsiveness is not 
the product of local and regional distinctiveness.  As a result, the main conclusion to be drawn 
from the study is that existing local and regional differences can be accommodated under 
different regulatory models without appreciable differences in regulatory outcomes. 
 
This does not amount to an assertion that, in considering alternatives to the current 
regulatory structure, local regulatory expertise should not be preserved. A uniform securities law 
model and a passport model would allow for existing regulatory expertise to be maintained 
within existing local regulatory commissions. A single regulator (whether a model based on 
provincial delegation or federal action) could, if properly designed (for example, along industry 
lines and/or with regional offices) maintain existing expertise. To the extent that an LICR does 
not exist for certain industries and as a result, no one local regulator currently has expertise, a 
single regulator would allow for a consolidation of scattered expertise. 
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In the long-standing debate on reform of the securities regulatory framework in Canada, 
the issue of local and regional markets and the concerns of local market regulators have always 
been at the forefront of the discussion.  What is surprising is that while both proponents and 
critics of securities regulatory reform hold deeply entrenched views on the topic of local and 
regional interests, little rigorous analysis has been conducted of the topic and the underlying 
issues.  
 
Critics have stated that a national securities commission would not be able to regulate 
effectively local and regional markets and would not take into account local and regional issues, 
priorities and interests.1  
 
Other commentators, however, have questioned why a national regulator could not be 
structured to take regional differences into account.2   
 
In the 2002 White Paper released by the Capital Markets Institute entitled “A Symposium 
on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationalization?”, Professor Doug Harris 
identifies the important role that accommodating local and regional interests plays in the debate 
on Canada’s securities regulatory structure.3 He states:  
 
We need a comprehensive study of the role of local and regional interests 
in the structure of securities regulation in Canada, the extent to which 
there are geographically segmented capital markets in Canada, the costs 
and benefits of such segmentation for the Canadian capital market as a 
whole, and the role that decentralized securities regulation plays in 
shaping those costs and benefits.  It is only on the basis of this kind of 
data that the debate can move beyond the unhelpful geographical 
generalizations that have characterized it to date. 4 
 
The following analysis attempts to fill this research gap such that stakeholders can engage 
in a more meaningful debate and so that proposals for reform can be analyzed on a more solid 
theoretical and empirical foundation.    
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Stephen Sibold’s comments at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/cmi/march8.doc and 
Doug Hyndman’s comments at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/cmi/news/Hyndman.doc. 
2 See, for example, Anita Anand, “Harmonizing Canadian Securities Laws: Considering Alternatives” 
in Globalization: Proceedings of the 8th Queen’s Annual Business Law Symposium (2001).   
3 A. Douglas Harris, A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationalization?  
White Paper (2002). 
4 Ibid at iv. 
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The objectives of this research study are two-fold. This study first examines the extent to 
which distinct local and regional capital markets exist in Canada. Second, it considers whether 
those markets, to the extent they exist, are best regulated on a local or regional basis. 
 
Part 2 examines whether distinct local capital markets exist in Canada.  Two primary sets 
of data are analyzed. First, an analysis is conducted of reporting issuers listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX) and the TSX Venture Exchange by province, industry type, and market 
capitalization. Second, GDP by province and industry is analyzed to assess the economic 
importance of various industries to regions in Canada. 
 
Part 3 assesses whether provincial regulators have developed levels and forms of 
regulation that have been responsive to the needs of LICRs located within their province.  Part 3 
concludes by analyzing the relationship of these local regulatory responses to the issue of 
distinctive local markets and their impact on analyzing optimal regulatory structure.   
  
Part 4 highlights other developments in the Canadian capital markets that are relevant to 
the debate on local and regional interests.  
  
Part 5 highlights how the securities regulatory structure of the United States addresses 
local markets and interests. 
 
Part 6 concludes with comments on the weight and significance that ought to be given to 
local and regional issues in analyzing optimal securities regulatory structure for Canada.  
 
2. Analysis of Local and Regional Capital Markets 
 
In the context of the debate on local and regional markets, the following broad 
generalizations are often made: 
 
• Alberta has a local market in oil and gas; 
• Alberta and B.C. have local markets that focus on micro- and small-cap issuers; 
• B.C. has a local market in mining and is known for attracting technology issuers; and 
• Ontario has a local market for financial services. 
 
This part of the study tests the validity of these particular assertions, and analyzes 
whether distinct local markets exist in Canada by (a) examining issuer data; (b) discussing 
investor location; and (c) conducting an analysis of GDP figures classified by province.  
 
As Professor Harris has pointed out: 
 
If local and regional flexibility is proven by an empirical study to be 
critical to the development of businesses that will make Canada globally 
competitive in the future, then the fact that a federal securities regulator 
does not offer a clear way to provide it may prove to be determinative 
against that proposal.  If, on the other hand, local and regional flexibility 
213 
is found to be a red herring, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
various reform proposals would have to be reassessed on a fundamental 
level. 5 
 
An analysis is first conducted of reporting issuers listed on the TSX and the TSX Venture 
Exchange by industry type and by the province in which the issuer’s head office is located. 
The location of an issuer’s head office will generally indicate which province’s or territory’s 
securities commission is the principal regulator under the Mutual Reliance Review System 
(MRRS).6 
 
To the extent that there is a critical mass of industry or sector specific issuers in a 
geographical region, there will likely be a development of expertise over time within the 
securities commission in that geographic area. There will also be a clustering of professionals 
such as securities lawyers, accountants and investment bankers that service these issuers and 
develop an expertise in the industry.  In this study, I label this phenomenon as a “local 
infrastructure for capital raising.”7 
 
In assessing whether an LICR exists for any particular industry, I have analyzed the data 
from four perspectives for each province and industry:  
  
1. The number of issuers headquartered in a province as a percentage of the total number of 
issuers in that industry;  
 
2. The number of issuers headquartered in a province as a percentage of the total number of 
issuers principally regulated by that province’s securities commission; 
 
3. The market capitalization of issuers in an industry headquartered in a province as 
a percentage of the total market capitalization of all issuers in that industry; and 
 
4. The market capitalization of issuers in an industry headquartered in a province as 
a percentage of the market capitalization all issuers principally regulated by that 
province’s securities commission.  
 
                                                 
5 Ibid at 51-52. 
6 See National Policy 43-201 Mutual Reliance Review System for Prospectuses and AIFs and National  
Policy 12-201 Mutual Reliance Review System for Exemptive Relief Applications. The MRRS is intended to 
reduce unnecessary duplication in the review of materials filed in multiple jurisdictions.  While an issuer is 
nonetheless required to file documents with all of the securities regulators in the jurisdictions in which securities 
are being distributed, the issuer is allowed to choose a principal regulator that has primary responsibility for 
reviewing the materials and providing comments. As at January 25, 2002, the securities regulators of British 
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia had agreed to act as principal 
regulators under National Policy 43-201.  Under the MRRS, an issuer’s principal regulator is: (a) the local 
securities regulatory authority in the jurisdiction in which the issuer’s head office is located; or (b) if the issuer’s 
head office is not in a jurisdiction in which a participating principal regulator is located, then an issuer can select 
a participating principal regulator as its principal regulator, if the issuer has a reasonable connection with the 
relevant jurisdiction. Both an issuer and a principal regulator can propose to change the principal regulator.    
7 Previously defined as “LICR.” 
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This study assumes that regulatory responsiveness and expertise are proportional to 
the absolute importance of an issuer segment as well as its market capitalization.  It may be, 
however, that commissions devote slightly more resources to industries that dominate in their 
respective provinces. For example, if the largest issuer group in any particular province 
represents one-third of all issuers in that jurisdiction, it may demand and receive more than 
one third of the regulator’s attention. The smallest groups of issuers may receive less than their 
directly proportionate share of attention.  
 
The issue of the minimum required critical mass of issuers in any particular industry for 
a regulator to establish expertise in the area also bears on how regulatory expertise is distributed 
among the provincial and territorial regulators.   
 
It is inferred that local regulatory expertise will develop in provinces that host LICRs 
because of the volume of transactions that local regulators will review from issuers in the 
relevant industry and their interaction with such issuers and their service providers.  However, 
the location of an industry’s LICR does not provide any indication of the location of its investors.  
The province in which an issuer’s head office is located, which is the basis this study uses for 
determining whether an LICR exists, does not indicate where the majority of its investors reside. 
The debate on local and regional interests appears to have focused, thus far, on issuers.  
However, an analysis of whether distinct local markets exist in Canada must also consider 
investor location and whether there are appreciable differences among investors throughout the 
country that would create a need for distinct local regulation. 
 
In addition, the province in which an issuer’s head office is located does not necessarily 
indicate where the majority of its operations takes place.  Hence, the LICR for any given industry 
does not necessarily correlate with the industry’s contribution to the provincial economy, as 
evidenced by GDP data broken down by province and industry. For example, the relative 
economic impact of the mining industry in the Northwest Territories’ GDP is over nine times 
greater than in B.C.’s GDP.8  Certain mining issuers that are headquartered in B.C. and therefore 
subject to the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) as principal regulator are 
actually engaged in mining exploration in Newfoundland and the Northwest Territories. Even 
though the bulk of such issuers’ economic activities is taking place in other parts of the country, 
they may have decided to locate their head offices in B.C. because of the province’s LICR for 
mining. Therefore, the level of mining in B.C. or the significance of the mining industry to the 
B.C. economy cannot be determined simply based on the number, or percentage, of public 
companies headquartered there.9 As such, it is also difficult to argue that B.C. has more of an 
interest in the LICR for mining than other jurisdictions where mining activities are actually 
undertaken.   
                                                 
8 See Appendix A, Tables 1b and c. 
9 Further to this point, Ontario Teachers Pension Plan has stated that “We are uncertain as to whether there 
are distinctive regional or local characteristics in Canadian capital markets that are not simply the result of 
particular concentrations of different industry segments in different parts of the country.”  Ontario Teachers 
Pension Plan Board, submission to WPC.  Furthermore, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt submitted to the 
Wise Persons’ Committee that “although there are regions of the country where issuers in a particular industry 
may be concentrated, in our experience the capital markets activities of Canadian issuers generally extend 
beyond provincial boundaries”.  Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, submission to WPC. 
215 
(a) TSX and TSX Venture Exchange Data 
 
There are a total of 3,263 issuers listed on the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange.10  
 
Of the 1,222 issuers listed on the TSX, the greatest portion consists of issuers 
headquartered in Ontario (577 issuers at 47%).11 This is followed by Alberta (233 issuers at 
19%), and B.C. and Quebec (each with 177 issuers at 14% each). The remaining provinces and 
territories each headquarter less than 2% each of TSX listed issuers.  
 
The total market capitalization of all issuers listed on the TSX is approximately 
$923.0 billion. Over one-half of the market capitalization is comprised of issuers headquartered 
in Ontario ($492.6 billion at 53%).12  This is followed by Alberta ($177.8 billion at 19%), 
Quebec ($155.6 billion at 17%), B.C. ($45.2 billion at 5%), and Manitoba ($30.2 billion 
at 3%).13 
 
Most TSX listed issuers fall into one of four industry classifications: Diversified 
Industries (339 issuers at 28%), Financial Services (243 issuers at 20%), Mining (159 issuers at 
13%), and Oil and Gas (123 issuers at 10%).14   
 
The Financial Services and Oil and Gas industries each represent a greater proportionate 
share of total market capitalization than absolute issuer base. Financial Services issuers represent 
32% and Oil and Gas 23% of the total market capitalization of the TSX, while Mining 
represents 9%.15 
 
Of the 2,041 issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange, the greatest portion consists of 
issuers headquartered in B.C. (983 issuers at 48%).16 This is followed by Alberta (415 issuers at 
22%), Ontario (415 issuers at 20%), and Quebec (142 issuers at 7%).  
 
The total market capitalization of all issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange is 
approximately $11.8 billion. Over 40% of the TSX Venture Exchange’s market capitalization is 
comprised of issuers headquartered in B.C.17  This is followed by Alberta (at 27%), Ontario 
(at 21%), and Quebec (at 7%).18 
 
                                                 
10 See Appendix B, Table 1a and Table 1b.  TSX data is current as at May 31, 2003. TSX Venture Exchange data 
is current as at July 7, 2003.  
11 Appendix B, Table 1a.  
12 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
15 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
16 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
17 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
18 Ibid. 
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Almost one half of all TSX Venture exchange issuers are classified as Mining issuers 
(918 issuers at 45%) followed by Technology issuers (324 at 16%), Diversified Industry issuers 
(335 at 16%) and Oil and Gas issuers (282 at 14%).19 
 
The market capitalization analysis reveals similar results. Mining represents 45% of the 
total market capitalization of the TSX Venture Exchange, followed by Oil and Gas at 20%, 
Diversified Industries at 16%, and Technology at 13%.20 
 
(i) Oil and Gas   
 
TSX Data:  
 
Oil and Gas issuers represent 10% of all TSX listed issuers.21  Of the 123 Oil and Gas 
issuers listed on the TSX, 113 (92%) are headquartered in Alberta and therefore most likely 
regulated by the Alberta Securities Commission (ASC) as the principal regulator under MRRS.22  
While Alberta headquarters an overwhelming majority of Oil and Gas issuers in absolute terms, 
it hosts only slightly more than one-half of the total market capitalization of all Oil and Gas 
issuers (55%).23 Ontario follows at 8% and the remaining Canadian jurisdictions each host less 
than 1% of the market capitalization of this industry.24 Surprisingly, foreign issuers comprise 
36% of the industry’s market capitalization.  In fact, BP p.l.c, the largest of such issuers, 
represents 27% of the market capitalization of all oil and gas listed on the TSX, followed by 
Burlington Resources Inc., at 7%.25    
 
The ASC likely acts as principal regulator for 233 TSX listed issuers under MRRS, and 
as such, Oil and Gas issuers represent 48% (113/233) of the ASC’s issuers listed on the TSX that 
are headquartered in Alberta.26 However, Oil and Gas issuers listed on the TSX comprise 67% of 
the total market capitalization of all TSX issuers headquartered in Alberta.27  
 
TSX Venture Exchange Data:  
 
Oil and Gas issuers represent 14% of all TSX Venture Exchange listed issuers.28  Of the 
282 Oil and Gas issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange, a substantial majority (173 issuers 
at 61%) are headquartered in Alberta.29 Oil and Gas issuers headquartered in Alberta comprise 
                                                 
19 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
20 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
21 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
22 See National Policies 43-201 and 12-201, supra note 6. 
23 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
24 Ibid. 
25 The total market capitalization of all foreign oil and gas issuers listed on the TSX is $77.0 billion. BP p.l.c, 
(headquartered in the U.K.) has a market capitalization of $58.4 billion. This is followed by Burlington 
Resources Inc. (headquartered in the U.S.) with a market capitalization of $14.5 billion, Murphy Oil 
Corporation (headquartered in the U.S.) with a market capitalization of $2.1 billion, and Ultra Petroleum Corp. 
(headquartered in the U.S.) with a market capitalization of $1.2 billion (as at May 31, 2003). 
26 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
29 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
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77% of the market capitalization of all oil and gas issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange 
($1.9 billion out of total industry market capitalization of $2.4 billion).30 
 
The ASC acts as principal regulator for 440 TSX Venture Exchange listed issuers under 
MRRS, and as such, Oil and Gas issuers represent 39% (173/440) of the ASC’s issuers listed on 
the TSX Venture Exchange that are headquartered in Alberta.31   However, Oil and Gas issuers 
represent 58% of the total market capitalization of all TSX Venture Exchange issuers principally 




These figures provide strong support for the claim that there is an LICR for Oil and 
Gas issuers in Alberta.   
 




Mining issuers represent 13% of all TSX listed issuers.  Ontario and B.C. are 
headquarters to over 80% of the 159 Mining issuers listed on the TSX.33  Slightly more are 
headquartered in Ontario (68 issuers at 43%) than in B.C. (60 issuers at 40%).   
 
In respect of market capitalization, Mining issuers headquartered in Ontario comprise 
49% of the total market capitalization of all Mining issuers listed on the TSX, while those 
headquartered in B.C. comprise 16% of the industry’s total market capitalization.34 
 
These data are surprising given that a blanket generalization is often made that the 
majority of Mining issuers are located in B.C.  The data does not bear this claim out in respect of 
TSX listed issuers, although there is more merit to the claim upon examination of TSX Venture 
Exchange data, set out below.    
 
However, Mining issuers represent a greater proportionate share of the BCSC’s total TSX 
listed issuer base as compared to the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).  Mining issuers 
represent 9% of the total market capitalization of all TSX issuers principally regulated by the 
OSC but 31% of those regulated by the BCSC.35 
 
                                                 
30 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
31 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
32 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
33 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
34 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
35 Ibid. 
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TSX Venture Exchange Data:  
 
Mining issuers represent almost one-half of all TSX Venture Exchange listed issuers 
(45%). A large majority of the 918 Mining issuers are headquartered in B.C. (584 issuers at 
64%).36 Ontario (168 issuers at 18%) and Alberta (77 issuers at 8%) follow.  
 
The market capitalization analysis roughly parallels the above analysis. Mining issuers 
headquartered in B.C. comprise 60% of the market capitalization of all Mining issuers listed 
on the TSX Venture Exchange ($3.2 billion out of total industry market capitalization of 
$5.2 billion).37 This is followed by Ontario at 21%, Alberta at 8% and Quebec at 7%.38  
 
Mining issuers headquartered in B.C. comprise 65% of the total market capitalization 
of all TSX Venture Exchange issuers principally regulated by the BCSC.39  This is followed 
by Saskatchewan at 61%, Ontario at 43%, Quebec at 42%, Nova Scotia at 17%, and Alberta 




The data suggest that both B.C. and Ontario host an LICR for TSX listed mining issuers.  
The data also support the claim that B.C. hosts an LICR for TSX Venture Exchange listed 
mining issuers.   
 




Technology issuers represent 10% of all TSX listed issuers.  Of the 128 Technology 
issuers on the TSX, the majority are headquartered in Ontario (74 issuers at 58%).41 This is 
followed by B.C. (24 issuers at 19%), Quebec (19 issuers at 15%), and Alberta (10 issuers at 
8%).42  The market capitalization data are slightly more pronounced than the absolute numbers in 
favour of Ontario. Technology issuers headquartered in Ontario comprise 83% of the market 
capitalization of all technology issuers listed on the TSX.43 This is followed by Quebec at 9% 
and B.C. at 7%.44   
 
Technology issuers represent a relatively low proportion of each provincial regulator’s 
overall TSX listed issuer base with each of B.C., Ontario, Quebec and Alberta at 14% or under.45  
                                                 
36 Appendix B, Table 1b. 




41 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
42 Ibid. 
43  Appendix B, Table 1c. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
219 
Technology issuers represent 8% of the total market capitalization of all TSX issuers principally 
regulated by the OSC. This is followed by B.C. at 7% and Quebec at 3%.46 
 
TSX Venture Exchange Data:  
 
Technology issuers represent 16% (324/2041) of all TSX Venture Exchange listed 
issuers. Of the 324 Technology issuers on the TSX Venture Exchange, a significant number are 
headquartered in B.C. (139 issuers at 43%).47 This is followed by Ontario (78 at 24%), Alberta 
(62 issuers at 19%) and Quebec (34 issuers at 10%).48   
 
B.C.’s lead is slightly less pronounced when market capitalization data are analysed. 
Technology issuers headquartered in B.C. comprise 32% of the market capitalization of all 
technology issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange, followed closely by Ontario at 30%, 
Alberta at 16% and Quebec at 10%.49   
 
From the perspective of the provinces, technology issuers represent between 14% to 25% 
of each of Alberta, B.C., Manitoba, N.B., N.S., Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan’s TSX 
Venture Exchange issuer base.50 However, Technology issuers represent more of the total market 
capitalization of all TSX Venture Exchange issuers principally regulated by Ontario and Quebec 




While a generalization is often made that B.C. is a hotbed for technology issuers, the data 
reveal that Ontario actually hosts an LICR for TSX listed technology companies while B.C. hosts 
an LICR for TSX Venture Exchange listed technology issuers. 
 
It is interesting to note that there are many similarities between technology companies 
and mining companies, which provides a partial explanation as to why an LICR for TSX Venture 
Exchange listed technology issuers is developing in B.C.  Both mining and technology 
companies often have no or limited revenue streams in the early part of their business cycle, 
making investments in such companies rather speculative.  Relatedly, the LICR for technology 
companies in B.C. is at a much more nascent stage than the LICR for mining companies because 
the technology industry is at a much earlier stage in its development than mining.  
 
                                                 
46 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
47 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
50 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
51 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
220 
(iv)  Financial Services 
 
TSX Data:  
 
Financial Services issuers represent 20% of the TSX listed issuers.52 Of the 243 Financial 
Services issuers listed on the TSX, almost 80% (193 issuers at 79%) are headquartered in 
Ontario. The market capitalization data produces similar results. Financial Services issuers 
headquartered in Ontario comprise 76% of the market capitalization of all financial services 
issuers listed on the TSX.53    
 
TSX listed Financial Services issuers represent 33% of the OSC’s TSX listed 
headquartered issuers,54 but 45% of the total market capitalization of all TSX issuers 
headquartered there.55    
 
TSX Venture Exchange Data:  
 
Financial Services issuers represent a very small component of the TSX Venture 
Exchange at 4% (81 issuers).56 Of those 81 issuers, a significant portion is headquartered in 
Ontario (32 issuers at 40%). This is followed by B.C. (31 issuers at 25%) and Alberta (17 issuers 
at 21%).   Financial Services issuers clearly do not cluster on the TSX Venture Exchange.  
 
The market capitalization data maintains the above rankings, but Ontario’s lead is more 
pronounced and B.C. and Alberta share of market capitalization is slightly less than their 
absolute numbers suggest. Financial Services issuers headquartered in Ontario comprise 61% of 
the market capitalization of all financial services issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange.57 
This is followed by B.C. at 15% and Alberta at 13%.   
 
Financial Services issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange represent less than 5% of 
each provincial regulator’s headquartered issuer base.58 Financial Services issuers comprise 11% 
of the total market capitalization of all TSX Venture Exchange issuers principally regulated by 
the OSC.59  
 
                                                 
52 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
53 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
54 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
55 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
56 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
57 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
58 Appendix B, Table 1b. 




The data indicate that Ontario hosts an LICR for financial services issuers.  
 




Communications and Media issuers represent only 5% of all TSX listed issuers.  Ontario 
and Quebec are headquarters to 73% of all Communications and Media issuers listed on the 
TSX.60  More are headquartered in Ontario (31 issuers at 46%) than in Quebec (18 issuers 
at 27%).   
 
In respect of market capitalization, however, both Ontario and Quebec each headquarter 
39% of the total market capitalization of this industry.   
 
However, Communications and Media issuers appear to consume a greater proportionate 
share of the Quebec Securities Commission’s (QSC) resources as compared to the OSC.  
Communications and Media issuers represent 10% of all TSX listed issuers principally regulated 
by the QSC, as opposed to 5% of the OSC’s principally regulated TSX listed issuer base. In 
respect of market capitalization, Communications and Media issuers represent 8% of the total 
market capitalization of all TSX issuers principally regulated by the OSC but one quarter of 
those regulated by the QSC.61 
 
TSX Venture Exchange Data:  
 
Communications and Media issuers represent only 1% of all TSX Venture Exchange 
listed issuers. Of the 29 Communications and Media issuers, almost one half are headquartered 
in B.C. (14 issuers at 48%), followed by Ontario at 31%, Alberta at 17% and Quebec at 4%.62 
 
The market capitalization data suggest quite different results:  Alberta’s issuer base for 
this industry represents 71% of the industry’s total market capitalization.63 This is followed by 
B.C. at 15%, Ontario at 13% and Quebec at 2%.64  
 
Communications and Media issuers headquartered in each of the provinces and territories 
comprise less than 2% of the issuers principally regulated by that province and less than 6% of 
the total market capitalization of all TSX Venture Exchange issuers principally regulated by that 
jurisdiction’s securities regulator.65  
 
                                                 
60 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Appendix B, Table 1b. 






Ontario and Quebec each have an LICR in Communications and Media issuers listed on 
the TSX.  This industry appears to consume more proportionate resources of the QSC than the 
OSC. B.C., Ontario and Alberta appear to have an LICR in Communications and Media issuers 
listed on the TSX Venture Exchange: B.C. and Ontario because of the absolute number of issuers 
in the industry headquartered in there and Alberta because of the strength of the market 
capitalization of the industry’s issuers that are located in that province.  
 




Diversified Industry issuers represent 28% of all TSX listed issuers.  Of the 339 
Diversified Industry issuers on the TSX, the majority are headquartered in Ontario (155 issuers 
at 46%).66 This is followed by Quebec (65 issuers at 19%), Alberta (57 issuers at 17%), and B.C. 
(40 issuers at 12%).67   
 
The market capitalization data shows that Ontario still ranks first (at 43%) but with a 
smaller lead than the absolute numbers above suggest.68  Diversified Industry issuers 
headquartered in Quebec comprise 29% of the total market capitalization of all Diversified 
Industry issuers listed on the TSX, which represents a larger share than the absolute numbers 
indicate above.69  This is followed by Alberta and B.C. each at 15%. 70 
 
Diversified Industry issuers represent 37% of the QSC’s TSX listed issuer base and 
27% of the OSC’s TSX listed issuer base.  This is followed by the ASC at 24% and the BCSC 
at 23%.71   
 
The above rankings remain the same when market capitalization data are considered, 
although the industry represents a smaller proportion of each regulator’s overall TSX listed 
issuer base: Diversified Industry issuers represent 29% of the TSX listed issuer base 
headquartered in Quebec. This is followed by Ontario at 20%, and Alberta and B.C., each 
at 15%.72 
 
                                                 
66 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
72 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
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TSX Venture Exchange Data:  
 
Diversified Industries issuers represent 16% (335/2041) of all TSX Venture Exchange 
listed issuers. Two thirds of the 335 Diversified Industry issuers on the TSX Venture Exchange 
are headquartered in Ontario and B.C., (33% each at 111 issuers each).73 This is followed by 
Alberta (81 at 24%), and Quebec (31 issuers at 9%).74  In respect of market capitalization,  
B.C. ranks first, as headquarters to 36% of Diversified Industry issuers listed on the TSX Venture 
Exchange. This is followed by Ontario at 25%, Alberta at 18% and Quebec at 13%.75   
 
From the perspective of the provinces, however, Diversified Industry issuers represent the 
greatest portion of the OSC’s TSX Venture Exchange issuer base: the industry represents 24% of 
the QSC’s TSX Venture Exchange issuer base, followed by the QSC at 24%, 18% of the ASC’s 
TSX Venture Exchange issuer base and 11% of the BCSC’s TSX Venture Exchange issuer.76  
 
However, the market capitalization data suggest that Diversified Industry issuers 
represent the greatest portion of Quebec’s TSX headquartered issuer base at 29%, which is 
greater than Ontario, Alberta and B.C., all of which are under 20%.77 
 




Life Sciences issuers represent only 6% of all TSX listed issuers.  Ontario and Quebec 
are headquarters to over 70% of all Life Sciences issuers listed on the TSX.78  Slightly more 
are headquartered in Ontario (27 issuers at 37%) than in Quebec (25 issuers at 34%).  This is 
followed by B.C. (14 issuers at 19%) and Alberta (5 issuers at 7%).79  
 
However, Ontario is headquarters to two-thirds of the total market capitalization of this 
industry, while Quebec is headquarters to only 12% of the total market capitalization of the 
industry.80 
 
From the perspective of the provinces, however, Life Sciences represent the greatest 
portion of the QSC’s TSX headquartered issuer base at 14%. Life Sciences represent less than 
10% of all other jurisdictions’ TSX headquartered issuer base.81 
 
                                                 
73 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
76 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
77 Appendix B, Table 1d. 
78 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
79 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
80 Appendix B, Table 1c. 
81 Appendix B, Table 1a. 
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TSX Venture Exchange Data:  
 




The data suggest that Ontario and Quebec each host an LICR for TSX listed Life 
Sciences issuers. 
 
(viii) Micro and Small Cap Issuers 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, a micro cap issuer is defined as having a market 
capitalization of less than $5 million and a small cap issuer is defined as having a market 




Micro cap issuers represent 7% of all TSX listed issuers.84  Of the 85 micro cap issuers 
listed on the TSX, more than half (46 issuers at 55%) are headquartered in Ontario. This is 
followed by B.C. at (22 issuers at 26%), and then Quebec and Alberta (each at 7 issuers at 
8% each.) 
 
Micro-cap issuers listed on the TSX represent between 12% to 3% of B.C., Ontario, 
Quebec and Alberta’s issuers headquartered in each province.   
 
Small cap issuers represent 43% of all TSX listed issuers.  Of the 520 small cap issuers 
listed on the TSX, just under half (227 issuers at 45%) are headquartered in Ontario and 
therefore most likely regulated by the OSC as the principal regulator under MRRS.  This is 
followed by B.C. and Alberta (95 issuers each at 18% each) and Quebec (84 issuers at 16%.) 
 
Small cap issuers represent a relatively high proportion of each regulator’s headquartered 
issuers listed on the TSX: 54% for B.C., 47% for Quebec, and 41% for each of Alberta and 
Ontario. 
 
TSX Venture Exchange Data: 
 
Micro cap issuers represent 76% of all TSX Venture Exchange listed issuers.85  Of the 
1,705 micro cap issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange, over one half (882 issuers at 52%) 
are headquartered in B.C. and therefore most likely regulated by the BCSC as the principal 
regulator under MRRS.  This is followed by Alberta (335 issuers at 20%), Ontario (329 issuers 
at 19%) and Quebec (112 issuers at 7%). 
                                                 
82 Appendix B, Table 1b. 
83 See submission from the Ontario Securities Commission to Wise Persons’ Committee which also used the same 
classification.  Ontario Securities Commission, submission to WPC. 
84 See Appendix B, Tables 2a and 2b. 
85 See Appendix B, Tables 3a and 3b. 
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Micro cap issuers represent an extraordinary percentage of each regulator’s 
headquartered issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange. B.C. ranks first (886/983 issuers 
at 81%). This is followed by Quebec and Ontario (112/142 issuers and 329/415 issuers, 
respectively, at 79% each) and then Alberta (335/440 issuers at 76%.) 
 
Small cap issuers represent 23% of all TSX Venture Exchange listed issuers.  Of the 
519 small cap issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange, 204 (39%) are headquartered in B.C. 
and therefore most likely regulated by the BCSC as the principal regulator under MRRS.  This is 
followed by Alberta (139 issuers at 27%), Ontario (108 issuers at 21%) and Quebec (43 issuers 
at 8%.) 
 
Small cap issuers represent 32% of Alberta’s headquartered TSX Venture Exchange 
issuer base, followed by Quebec at 30%, Ontario at 26% and B.C. at 19%.  
 
Combined TSX and TSX Venture Exchange Data: 
 
Micro cap issuers represent 52% of all issuers listed on either the TSX or the TSX 
Venture Exchange.86 Of the 1,789 micro cap issuers listed on one of the two exchanges, a 
majority (908 issuers at 51%) are headquartered in B.C. and therefore most likely regulated by 
the BCSC as the principal regulator under MRRS. This is followed by Ontario (375 issuers at 
21%), Alberta (342 issuers at 19%) and Quebec (119 issuers at 7%). 
 
The BCSC acts as principal regulator for 1,271 issuers on both exchanges under MRRS 
and as such, micro cap issuers represent 71% (908) of the BCSC’s issuers listed on either 
exchange. This is followed by Alberta (51%), Ontario (38%) and Quebec (37%).  
 
Small cap issuers represent 30% of all issuers listed on either the TSX or the TSX 
Venture Exchange.  Of the 1,036 small cap issuers listed on both exchanges, just under one third 
(335 issuers at 32%) are headquartered in Ontario and therefore most likely regulated by the 
OSC as the principal regulator under MRRS.  Ontario is followed closely by B.C. (29%) and 
Alberta (23%).  Quebec ranks fourth (12%).  
 
Small cap issuers represent between 24 and 40% of each regulator’s headquartered 




The TSX data suggest that Ontario hosts an LICR for both micro and small cap issuers.  
However, the TSX Venture Exchange data suggests that B.C. hosts the LICR for both micro cap 
and small cap issuers on this exchange.  The aggregate data from both exchanges highlight that 
B.C. hosts an LICR for micro cap issuers and Ontario, B.C. and Alberta each host LICRs for 
small cap issuers. 
 
                                                 
86 See Appendix B, Tables 4a and 4b. 
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(b) Investor Location 
 
The debate on local and regional markets appears to have focused on issuers.  However, 
an analysis of whether distinct geographic markets exist in Canada must also consider investor 
location and whether there are appreciable differences among investors throughout the country 
that would create a need for distinct local regulation. 
 
As the OSC states in its submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee:  
 
There are, of course, regional economic concerns within Canada, but no 
longer is anything just a regional concern; no economic sector or issue is 
the exclusive concern of any province, territory or region.  The oil industry 
is as much potential interest to investors in Ontario or Quebec as it is in 
Alberta. The auto parts industry is of as much potential interest to 
investors in Alberta as it is to investors in Ontario; the biotech industry is 
as important to investors in Prince Edward Island as to investors in 
Quebec.87   
 
The location of an industry’s LICR does not provide any indication of the location of its 
investors.  The province in which an issuer’s head office is located, which is the basis for 
determining LICR, does not indicate where the majority of its investors reside.  
 
While Professors Cumming, Kaul and Mehrotra find that most private equity investors 
reside in the same province as the entrepreneurs in whose companies they invest,88 their findings 
cannot be generalized for all stages of financing and investors because of the distinct nature of 
the venture capital and private equity market.  In addition, data on investor location for public 
companies is generally unavailable.89 
 
If it is true that investors are located throughout the county for other types of financings, 
then in considering the issue of distinct local and regional interests from the perspective of 
investors, one would need to consider whether investors that reside in particular provinces have 
distinct characteristics that would justify the need for different levels or forms of regulation.  
                                                 
87 Supra note 83.  Similarly, the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada stated the following in relation 
the mining industry in its submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee:  “We believe that the exploration 
industry is a national industry for several reasons. First, the issuers are resident in primarily B.C. and Ontario 
but they also exist in Quebec, Alberta, Saskatchewan and the Maritimes. Second, investors are resident in 
primarily B.C. and Ontario but they also exist in Quebec, Alberta, Saskatchewan and the Maritimes. This means 
that issuers, regardless of their home jurisdiction, must raise financing in multiple jurisdictions – particularly as 
their projects advance. We don’t accept the notion that certain provincial regulators should be charged with 
advancing the interests of certain industries or certain sized issuers because this implies that the other regulators 
are letting down companies or investors who reside in their jurisdictions. As well, we don’t see why these so-
called regional issues could not be handled by the local offices of a single regulator or by the office of a single 
regulator which is charged with administering the affairs of an industry or other issuer group.”  PDAC, 
submission to WPC. 
88 D. Cumming, A. Kaul and V. Mehrotra, “Provincial Preferences in Private Equity” (WPC Research Study, 
2003). 
89 See D. Cumming, A. Kaul and V. Mehrotra, “Fragmentation and the Canadian Stock Markets” (WPC Research 
Study, 2003).  
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It should be noted that issuers are more likely than investors to apply pressure on local 
regulators to develop locally and regionally-specific rules and policies. Issuers and their 
professional advisors have frequent and sustained contact with securities regulators and many 
opportunities to have their views heard.   This statement cannot be made with the same force 
about investors.  Despite having a mandate of “investor protection”, securities regulators have 
infrequent contact with retail investors. Retail investors in widely held public companies do not 
have the economic incentives to apply pressure on regulators to adopt locally-specific rules or 
policies. While institutional investors have better incentives to make their views known to 
regulators, they are unlikely, as a general matter, to focus on rule changes that deal with local or 
regional issues. Instead, institutional investors are more likely to apply pressure on regulators to 
develop rules and policies that can be applied across the board to the entire spectrum of issuers 
in which they invest, such as corporate governance initiatives. There may, however, be some 
instances where investors’ interests are closely aligned with issuers’ interests, as in the context 
of a private company about to go public, and where both sets of stakeholders have an interest in 
pressuring regulators.90 
 
(c) GDP Analysis  
 
The stock exchange data above allow us to conclude that Alberta hosts an LICR in oil and 
gas, B.C. an LICR in mining and technology, Ontario an LICR in mining, technology, financial 
services, communications and media, and life sciences, and Quebec an LICR in communications 
and media and life sciences.   As well, the data allow us to conclude that Alberta, B.C. and 
Ontario each host an LICR for small cap issuers, and B.C. an LICR for micro-cap issuers. 
 
To be sure, however, the above data do not allow us to conclude that these industries are 
local to host provinces or that host provinces have distinct local interests in the capital markets 
regulation or general regulation of those industries.  
 
This section examines data on GDP,91 classified by province and industry, to examine 
the economic significance of selected industries to the provinces that host their LICRs and 
other provinces.   
 
Statistics Canada provides only aggregate figures for “Mining and Oil and Gas 
Extraction.”  Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction represents 17.1% ($20.5 billion) of Alberta’s 
GDP but only 3% of B.C.’s GDP ($3.2 billion).92 This industry is of greater proportionate 
significance to the economies of the Northwest Territories93 (representing 28% of its GDP at  
                                                 
90 As discussed in the following section, provincial securities regulators have been responsive to the needs of both 
issuers and early stage investors. 
91 Industry GDP estimates are prepared using a value added approach, which is the value of an industry’s gross 
output less the value of intermediate inputs required in the production process. GDP is gross in the sense that it 
does not deduct items such as the depreciation of capital assets.  
92 See Appendix A, Tables 1a and b. 
93 See Appendix A, Table 1c. 
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$766 million), Newfoundland94 (representing 17.9% of its GDP at $2.3 billion) and 
Saskatchewan95 (representing 14% of its GDP at $4 billion).  
 
GDP data by province and industry reveal that “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” 
represents 22% of Ontario’s GDP ($88.7 billion) but also represents 12% to 23% of all the other 
provinces and territories’ GDP.96  As such, it would not be valid to claim that financial services 
is an industry local to Ontario: financial services is important to the economies of all the 
provinces and no one province has inherent ownership in fostering the general growth of this 
industry or encouraging capital formation for this industry.   
 
Even though the infrastructure for capital raising for these industries may be clustered in 
certain regions of the country, the above GDP data suggest that the economic significance of 
these industries transcends regional boundaries, and that many provinces are interested in 
fostering policies and programs that encourage such industries.  As a result, it is not improper 
to conclude that these industries are national in character. 
 
(d) Implications for Optimal Regulatory Structure 
 
The above analysis reveals that infrastructures for capital raising for certain industries are 
centred in certain regions in Canada.  Other provinces may have an interest equal to that of the 
province that hosts the LICR, however, given investor location and the importance of those 
industries to the economies of other provinces, as borne out by GDP data. 
 
While securities regulatory responsibility is currently divided on the basis of issuer 
location, it is not the only plausible allocation; investor location and economic impact are 
two other bases that could potentially be used. 
 
In assessing possible alternatives to the current regulatory structure, the local regulatory 
expertise that has developed as a result of LICRs for certain industries should be preserved.  
 
Under a USL Model, existing provincial commissions would continue to operate in a 
manner similar to that under the current system, and thus would allow existing local regulatory 
expertise to be maintained.  
 
A Passport Model based on issuer location or issuer choice will also likely preserve 
existing regulatory expertise because issuers will likely choose to headquarter or choose to be 
regulated by the regulator that is considered to be the expert for that particular industry.  
 
                                                 
94 See Appendix A, Table 1d. 
95 See Appendix A, Table 1e. 
96 See Appendix A, Tables 1a to 1g. 
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A single regulator model, properly designed, can also preserve existing local regulatory 
expertise.97  This model will also allow for a consolidation of expertise to the extent that it is 
dispersed among many regulators under the current system. A single regulator ought to also be 
divided along major industry lines that currently have LICRs, and should also have a unit 
focused on smaller issuers.   
 
A single regulator model must also address the issue of whether the existing regulatory 
expertise should be housed in regional offices.  With advances in communication technology, 
regulatory experts need not necessarily be housed in the existing LICR.   However, it may be 
desirable to do so.  The impact of this desire depends on the weight to be accorded to it, relative 
to factors favouring centralized staffing and expertise.  Stakeholders have expressed the view that 
“face to face” contact with regulators (or the possibility of the same) is important to issuers and 
their professional advisors.  This close contact may in part account for the development of LICRs 
and help to explain the development of the regulatory expertise in these industries.  A single 
regulator model must also address the issue of the power and scope of authority that may be 
vested in regional offices.  
 
A concern that is often expressed is that a single regulator model will pay more 
attention to larger issuers and not be as responsive to smaller issuers; a concerted effort must 
be made to avoid this result.98  As discussed in Part 5 below, the SEC has a small business 
unit within its Division of Corporation Finance, which suggests one approach to addressing 
this concern.   
 
It should be highlighted here that the needs of smaller issuers should not be conflated 
with the need for local rules.  Smaller issuers that engage in (or expect to engage in) inter-
provincial capital activity need rules that will allow for the raising of capital in a cost effective 
manner.99  As will be discussed in Part 4, even exclusively intra-provincial issuers may not need  
                                                 
97 CIBC’s submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee states “The governance structure [of a national regulator] 
must represent the regional needs of the country using the high level of skills and securities experience currently 
found in the provincial commissions… The high levels of regulatory, legal, accounting and other skills currently 
available in many provinces should continue to be used in the creation of the national regulator for example by 
using certain offices as the centres for certain kinds of specializations.”  CIBC, submission to WPC.  See also, 
Phillips, Hager & North, which has stated in this regard:  “we do not see why a central regulator cannot develop 
or hire the expertise to address regional and local needs. Be it oil and gas, mining, fishery, expertise can be 
bought with savings from having a centralized regulator rather than 13 jurisdictions.”  Phillips, Hager & North, 
submission to WPC. 
98 According to Discovery Capital Corporation, a B.C. venture capital firm, “The Inter-Provincial Securities 
Framework must preserve the opportunity to innovate regionally that has resulted in significant improvements 
to the regulatory regime for junior issuers in Canada.”  Discovery Capital Corporation, submission to WPC. 
99 See also Ogilvy Renault’s submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee, in which it states, “local laws are 
perceived to facilitate access to the securities market by, and appropriate regulation of, smaller regional or 
sectoral issuers. We are of the view that these laws can also be enacted and enforced on a uniform basis. There 
are smaller market participants in all jurisdictions of Canada who need to access low-cost, innovative financing. 
Smaller issuers are not well served by having separate non-uniform compliance regimes in thirteen provinces 
and territories: in fact, their ability to raise capital in more than one jurisdiction is impaired by cost and 
complexity.”  Ogilvy Renault, submission to WPC. 
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purely local rules, depending on the underlying rationale for the rule.100 
 
3. Local Regulatory Responsiveness  
 
This part analyzes whether local securities regulators have developed regulatory products 
that are responsive to their distinct local and regional capital markets.    
 
This part examines only external indicia of regulatory activity such as legislation, rules, 
and policies and does not examine internal regulatory activity such as different approaches to the 
administration of legislation, rules and policies that may exist between provincial regulators.   
 
In particular, this part reviews the regulatory products that have emerged from the 
provincial securities commissions, and that have been argued to be the products of regulatory 
responses to local and regional market needs, including: (a) the Junior Capital Pool Programs; 
(b) the System for Shorter Hold Periods with an Annual Information Form and Multilateral 
Instrument 45-102 Resale of Securities; (c) National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure 
for Oil & Gas Activities; (d) the OSC’s Accredited Investor Exemption and Multilateral 
Instrument 45-103 Capital Raising Exemptions; and (e) Saskatchewan’s Local Policy 45-601 
Community Venture Exemption. 
 
The following list of non-exhaustive factors is instructive in analyzing the issue of 
whether local regulators have been responsive to distinct local markets or issues: 
 
• Was the creation of the local policy followed by multilateral or national adoption by other 
provincial regulators? If so, then the local policy may be an example of regulatory 
innovation possibly supporting an argument for regulatory experimentation but not an 
argument for local regulation of distinct local markets.  In assessing this factor, there may 
be a difference of degree rather than kind; that is, the need for a policy, while not unique 
to any one local jurisdiction, may be more pronounced there, and so may have lead to 
the innovation.  
 
• Was the local policy created for the purpose of supporting an industry that is local to the 
province? If other provinces do not host the relevant industry in their geographical 
boundaries and are not interested in its development, then the local policy likely responds 
to a distinct local market. 
 
• Is the local policy’s application limited to issuers and investors that are all within the 
province? If investors are not located within the same province as the issuers to whom the 
policy applies, the local policy is not likely responding to a distinct local market. 
                                                 
100 Given that one potential model of regulatory reform would leave the provinces regulating purely intra-
provincial offerings, it is important to understand the economic significance of such offerings.  The focus is on 
offerings - whether exempt or by prospectus − that are extended only to residents of the province in which the 
issuer is located.  Even offerings that were available to a single resident of one additional province would not 
count, as they would be considered inter-provincial. This study was not able to obtain aggregate data to analyze 
the extent of such intra-provincial offerings in Canada.  
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However, the fact that issuers and investors may be located in the same province is not 
determinative of whether the policy responds to distinctive local interests.    
 
• Can the underlying rationale of an industry-specific local policy be generalized such 
that its stated purpose is to allow issuers to raise capital with ease and without the 
costs associated with preparing a prospectus? If so, then the local interest loses its 
distinctiveness and the necessity for a local policy may be questionable; a more general 
national policy that is not industry-specific may serve the local interests. 
 
This part concludes by assessing the relationship of local regulatory initiatives and 
responses to the issue of distinctive local and regional markets and optimal securities regulatory 
structure. 
 
(a)  Junior Capital Pool Programs  
 
Alberta’s Junior Capital Pool Program (JCPP)101 is cited as an example of local 
regulatory responsiveness to the needs of small businesses and issuers that are at an early stage 
and need to raise capital from public markets.102  
  
This section sets out details of the program and its successes in nurturing and raising 
capital for small businesses. This section also analyses the program’s relationship with local 
regulation of distinct markets and optimal regulatory structure.  
 
(i) History and Development   
 
The JCPP began in Alberta in 1986. The ASC stated that the objective of the JCPP was 
as follows: 
 
The Junior Capital Pool concept is designed to provide junior start up 
companies with an enhanced opportunity to become listed on The Alberta 
Stock Exchange thereby providing a viable and efficient mechanism to 
enable junior companies to raise further equity capital from the investing 
public. The Exchange recognizes however that as the listing and 
prospectus disclosure requirements for Junior Capital Pool Companies are 
substantially less than what is required for other companies, additional 
requirements are necessary to provide the market with sufficient disclosure 
and to limit abuse of this system.103   
 
In 1997, the BCSC and Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE) adopted a similar program, the 
Venture Capital Pool Program (VCPP). When the Alberta Stock Exchange (ASE) and the VSE 
                                                 
101 See Alberta Securities Commission Rule 46-501 Junior Capital Pool Offerings.       
102 See the submission of the Alberta Securities Commission to the Wise Persons’ Committee. See also the 
submission of DesJardins Ducharme Stein Monast to the Wise Persons’ Committee. 
103 M. Robinson, “Raising Equity Capital for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Using Canada’s Public Equity 
Markets” in P. Halpern, ed., Financing Growth in Canada (1997) 593 at 611. 
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merged in 1999, forming the Canadian Venture Exchange (CNDX),104 the JCPP and the VCPP 
policies were replaced with the Capital Pool Company Policy (CPC Program) of the CDNX. 
Shortly thereafter, CDNX and the Winnipeg Stock Exchange (WSE) merged, and the WSE’s 
Keystone Company Program (a program similar to the JCPP) was replaced with the CPC 
Program.  Currently, the TSX Venture Exchange operates a CPC Program in  B.C., Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec (collectively known as, the “CPC Jurisdictions”). 
This program, among other things, assists in harmonizing the ability of entrepreneurs to raise 
capital in the CPC Jurisdictions.  
 
As a general matter, this initiative was undertaken to provide a financing alternative for 
early stage firms that would normally raise seed capital privately.  
 
(ii) The Operation of the CPC Program  
 
TSX Venture Exchange Policy 2.4 provides that an issuer, meeting certain requirements, 
wishing to participate in the CPC Program must file a preliminary prospectus and related 
supporting documents with the TSX Venture Exchange as well as with each of the relevant 
securities regulatory authorities in the CPC Jurisdictions where the proposed distribution will be 
made. Upon issuance of the final receipt and completion of the initial public offering (IPO) 
(i.e. distribution of shares to at least 200 arm’s length shareholders), securities of a CPC issuer 
will trade on Tier 2 of the TSX Venture Exchange.   
 
A CPC issuer has 18 months following its IPO in which to identify an appropriate 
business and complete its “Qualifying Transaction”, which requires the CPC issuer to seek the 
approval of both the TSX Venture Exchange and a majority of its minority shareholders prior to 
completion.  In connection with obtaining shareholder approval, the CPC issuer must prepare a 
comprehensive information circular containing full, true and plain disclosure concerning the 
CPC issuer’s proposed activities. 
 
Following shareholder approval and the closing of the Qualifying Transaction, the CPC 
issuer transforms into a regular listed issuer on the TSX Venture Exchange.   
 
As of May 30, 2003, there were 145 CPC issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange, 
59 of which had not announced their Qualifying Transaction.105  
 
(iii)  Success of the Program 
 
The original JCPP in Alberta was very successful in increasing the access of junior firms 
to the capital markets to finance their expansions: 
 
• The failure rate by the end of 1992 for JCPP issuers listed on the ASE was just 26%.106  
 
                                                 
104 Now known as the TSX Venture Exchange. 
105 See http://www.tse.com/en/pdf/CPCReport.pdf and 
http://www.tsx.com/en/pdf/TSXVentureCapitalPoolCompanyList.pdf. 
106 Supra note 103 at 616. 
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• Between 1986 and 1992, 405 companies were listed as JCPP issuers, raising over 
$77 million in initial JCPP offerings.107  
 
• Although the number of JCPP issuers had drastically declined in the early 1990’s, 
99 companies were listed as JCPP companies by 1994.108 
 
• Of the 384 JCPP issuers that went public between 1986 and 1992, 86% had completed a 
major transaction by the end of 1992. 
 
Since the TSX Venture Exchange’s adoption of the JCPP, the CPC program has achieved 
the same successes: 
 
• Between 1987 and 2000, 1,236 CPC issuers listed and raised over $369 million in 
capital.109 
 
• One hundred and twenty-nine new CPC issuers were listed in 2000, raising nearly 
$40 million.110 
 
• Twenty-four percent of TSX Venture Exchange issuers that graduated to the TSX in 2000 
are former CPC issuers.111 
 
• In 2002, $15.6 million was raised by CPC issuers,112 45 CPC issuers were listed on the 
TSX Venture Exchange,113 and 37% of TSX Venture Exchange graduates to TSX were 
former CPC issuers.114 
 
(iv)  Analysis and Relationship to Optimal Regulatory Structure     
 
The ASC’s JCPP is a clear example of responsiveness to the issuer community, in 
particular by providing smaller issuers with an innovative method to raise public capital as an 
alternative to private funding.  
 
The fact that the ASC’s JCPP was quickly adopted by the BCSC and the VSE, as well as 
the WSE indicates that it was an extremely positive development that was well regarded by 
capital market players.  Its wider adoption by other provinces suggests, however, that financing 
for early stage companies is not of unique interest to any one locality or region. In my view, the 
ASC was not responding to a local or regional issue; the JCPP is an example of regulatory 
                                                 
107 Ibid at 613. 
108 Ibid. 








responsiveness to the needs of early stage businesses, a class of issuer that all jurisdictions want 
to develop and encourage.115  
 
The ASC’s JCPP is an example of regulatory innovation that may support the case for 
regulatory experimentation but it is not the product of local or regional market distinctiveness.    
 
In analyzing optimal regulatory structure, the issue is whether alternative regulatory 
models would be as responsive to the needs of smaller and early stage businesses. Under a USL, 
the provincial securities regulators would need to achieve consensus to implement such a 
program, but individual commissions would likely not have the authority to create local rules to 
implement a program of this type because it does not serve the needs of distinct local markets. 
Under a Passport Model, each provincial commission would have the authority to create a similar 
program, and other provincial commissions would have to make a decision as to whether to 
recognize it. A properly designed single regulator model could have a department that houses 
expertise and focuses on the needs of smaller and early stage businesses.116 As discussed in 
Part 5, a single Canadian regulator could house such expertise in an office similar to the SEC’s 
small business office.  
 
(b)  SHAIF and Multilateral Instrument 45-102 Resale of Securities  
 
In response to the strict hold-period requirements imposed on certain issuers, the BCSC 
and the ASC reduced the hold periods for certain securities offerings from twelve months to 
four months by introducing the System for Shorter Hold Periods for Issuers Filing an AIF 
(SHAIF System).   Their innovation was then adopted by all of the Canadian securities regulators 
other than Quebec through Multilateral Instrument 45-102 Resale of Securities (MI 45-102).117   
 
The SHAIF System reduced the twelve-month hold period to four months if the issuer 
of the securities was a “qualifying issuer” and had satisfied certain other conditions, including 
having filed an annual information form (AIF).  The SHAIF system reduced the need for special 
warrant financings, stimulated private placements and provided an alternative option to 
prospectus financing.  
 
The BCSC developed the SHAIF system on an interim basis in late November 1997 
through a policy and blanket order. Working with the ASC, the BCSC fine-tuned the system and 
together the commissions adopted the SHAIF system in both jurisdictions in 1998. Alberta 
adopted it by way of local rule.  
 
The adoption of MI 45-102 in November 2001 introduced a new regime for the resale of 
securities previously issued under exemptions from the prospectus requirements in all Canadian 
provinces and territories except Quebec.   
                                                 
115 As stated by the OSC, “Small businesses exist in every province, and they all require capital. Policies which 
encourage small business investment, publicly or privately, should not be concentrated in one region.”  See 
submission by Ontario Securities Commission, supra note 83. 
116 See the submissions of Ogilvy Renault, the Ontario Bar Association and Discovery Capital Corporation. 
117 Online at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca:8080/comdoc.nsf/0/d9c540943f47853b88256cbf0058c1bf/$FILE/MI%2045-
102.pdf. 
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In November 2001, the QSC issued a decision which set out circumstances under which 
the QSC would permit the resale restrictions applicable to privately placed securities in that 
province to be reduced from twelve months to four months.118    
 
Analysis and Relationship to Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure: 
SHAIF is an example of a rule that was created locally but it was not a response to a 
distinctive local interest. The rule did not focus on any particular local industry. The fact that the 
rule was rapidly adopted by regulators across the country demonstrates that it had applicability in 
other provinces as well.  
In this instance, the BCSC and the ASC were clearly responsive to the needs of issuers 
and early stage investors. Both the JCPP and the SHAIF system suggest that there may be a 
distinct small and medium sized business community and entrepreneurial culture in B.C. and 
Alberta to which local regulators are particularly sensitive and responsive.  However, this is not 
to say that similar rules and policies could not emerge from a single regulator model, properly 
designed, so long as it is responsive to the early stage financing needs of small and medium 
sized issuers.    
(c)  National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities 
 
National Instrument 51-101 (NI 51-101) creates new disclosure standards for oil and gas 
issuers, including the details of their operations, their compliance, corporate governance 
requirements, and their reserve reports.119   
 
As a result of the ASC’s expertise in this industry, the Canadian Securities Administrators 
(CSA) deferred to the ASC in heading this project.120  NI 51-101 was approved by the ASC on 
June 11, 2003.121  It was developed by the ASC on behalf of the 13 provincial and territorial 
securities commissions, which together form the CSA.  Other CSA members will consider 
adopting the rule over the next few months.122   
 
                                                 
118 Decision No. 2001-C-0507. 
119 Online at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca:8080/comdoc.nsf/0/9bc2fe07500a096d88256cb8005e882c/$FILE/NI51-
101.pdf. 
120 As was pointed out by the ASC in its submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee, “The ASC's sectoral interest 
and expertise in the oil and gas sector was recognized by the CSA when it assigned the ASC the lead role in 
developing the new oil and gas disclosure”.  Alberta Securities Commission, submission to WPC.  See also 
Discovery Capital Corporation’s submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee. 
121 See http://www.albertasecurities.com/DATA/items/press_rel/0000000713/.pdf. 
122 Ibid. 
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Analysis and Relationship to Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure: 
 
The ASC’s spearheading of this initiative on behalf of the CSA clearly signals an 
interprovincial acknowledgement that the ASC has significant expertise in oil and gas issues.  
 
It does not signify that Alberta has a distinctive local interest in oil and gas, as discussed 
in detail in Part 2. Even though oil and gas issuers may be clustered in Alberta as a part of the 
LICR, investors are not necessarily resident in Alberta and the industry has national economic 
significance.  
 
In considering alternatives to the current system, the ASC’s leadership on this program 
underscores the need to preserve the expertise that local regulators have gained as a result of their 
province hosting an LICR. As well, the strength of the LICR for oil and gas issuers in Alberta 
suggests the possibility of another regulatory method to rationalize or re-allocate responsibility 
among commissions such that the ASC would effectively become the “oil and gas securities 
commission” responsible for all oil and gas issues and other commissions would focus on their 
area of relative expertise. This model could be based on a similar rationalization process that was 
undertaken at the level of Canadian stock exchanges, as discussed in Part 4 below.   
 
It should be noted, however, that some larger interlisted oil and gas issuers are of the 
view that their interests are marginalized in policymaking in respect of the industry. For example, 
Nexen Inc., a large Canadian-based oil and gas and chemicals company, has stated that 
NI 51-101 “is geared to smaller Western Sedimentary Basin based companies which presents an 
entirely new set of problems for inter-listed companies such as Nexen.”123  Nexen’s submission 
to the Wise Persons’ Committee suggests that the policy “is a prime example of a ‘made-in-
Canada’ solution that could further marginalize Canada and Canadian issuers from international 
capital markets” and “reduce the attractiveness of Canadian capital markets to foreign issuers 
who would be required to comply with NI 51-101” as a result of its different approach to 
reserves disclosure.  
   
(d)  OSC’s Accredited Investor Exemption and Multilateral Instrument 45-103 
Capital Raising Exemptions 
 
Although there has not been a nationally co-ordinated approach to the reform of private 
placement exemption rules, Multilateral Instrument 45-103 (MI 45-103) follows the 
implementation of OSC Rule 45-501 – Exempt Distributions (OSC Rule 45-501) by the OSC 
on November 30, 2001.   
 
OSC Rule 45-501 replaced the most commonly used prospectus exemptions in the 
Securities Act (Ontario)124 with two new exemptions: the closely-held issuer exemption and the 
                                                 
123 See Nexen Inc.’s submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee. 
124 These previous exemptions included: the private company exemption; the $150,000 aggregate acquisition cost 
exemption; and the seed capital exemption. See Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. 
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accredited investor exemption.125  The accredited investor exemption contained in of OSC Rule 
45-501 is substantially the same as the exemption found in MI 45-103.  
 
The OSC revised its rules in order to make it easier for small businesses to raise start-up 
capital from the public without being subject to the registration or prospectus requirements of the 
Securities Act (Ontario).  These changes responded to a 1996 report of the OSC Task Force on 
Small Business Financing126 and a 1999 Ontario budget initiative, both of which called for a 
simplification of the previous requirements. 
 
According to the OSC, the number and value of investments in small businesses tripled in 
the 11 months after it relaxed prospectus rules for them.  The OSC has indicated that there were 
3,528 transactions worth $21 billion in the eleven-month period following the rule change in 
November 2001, as compared with an average of 1,287 transactions worth just over $6 billion in 
the years before.127   
 
Moreover, the OSC noted that investors were willing to invest more money in a wider 
range of companies.  The most obvious impact was the size of the typical investment. Previously, 
the most common investment was $150,000, the minimum allowed. After the new rule was 
implemented, the median investment fell to just $3,000.128 
 
After Ontario published its draft private placement rule changes in September 2000, the 
ASC and BCSC expressed concerns that the new proposals in Ontario were not suitable for small 
to mid-sized businesses because they contained many limitations and did not address access to 
middle income investors. As a result, the ASC and BCSC announced in November 2000, a 
private placement exemption harmonization project. 
 
The new private placement rules were implemented on March 30, 2002 in Alberta and 
April 3, 2002 in B.C. Since then, MI 45-103 has come into force in each of the remaining 
                                                 
125 The “accredited investor” exemption permits issuers to raise any amount at any time from any person or 
company defined as an “accredited investor”. These investors are considered to have the capacity to obtain and 
analyze the information needed to assess an investment opportunity without the assistance provided by a 
prospectus and to have the financial ability to withstand the loss of the investment.  In order to rely on the 
“accredited investor” exemption, certain requirements must be met: (a) the “accredited investor” must purchase 
as principal; (b) the investor must be an “accredited investor” listed in Rule 45-501 (the “accredited investor” 
list includes financial institutions, registered advisors and dealers, governments, pension funds and registered 
charities125); and (c) most trades to an “accredited investor” require that a Form 45-501FI together with the 
applicable form, be filed with the OSC within 10 days of the trade together with the applicable fee. 
126 Ontario, Ontario Securities Commission, Ontario Securities Commission Task Force on Small Business 
Financing – Final Report (1996). 
127 Ontario Securities Commission, News Release, “New Financings More Than Triple to $21 Billion, Benefiting 
Businesses in Ontario” (April 21, 2003). 
128 See Office of the Chief Economist, Ontario Securities Commission, “One Step Forward: A Study of the 
Economic Impact of OSC Rule 45-501 Exempt Distributions” (2002).  See also analysis by Peter Dungan, 
University of Toronto, Department of Economics, which, based on assumptions specified by the OSC, indicates 
that the rule change (a) generated 16,500 jobs in 2002 and will generate about 19,400 in 2003, shaving about 
0.2 percentage points off the Ontario unemployment rate;(b) raised Ontario's labour productivity by 
0.29 percentage points in 2002 and will raise it by a further 0.19 percentage points in 2003; and (c) added 
$2.63 billion to  Ontario’s GDP in 2002, and will add $2.42 billion in 2003. Ibid. 
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Canadian provinces and territories, with the exception of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick 
and Yukon.    
 
MI 45-103 contains four exemptions that allow the raising of capital without complying 
with the registration and prospectus requirements: 1) the private issuer exemption; 2) the family, 
friends and business associates exemption; 3) the offering memorandum exemption; and 4) the 
accredited investor exemption.   
 
Analysis and Relationship to Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure: 
 
The OSC’s initiative does not represent a response to a distinctive local market or issue. 
The exemption is not industry specific and other provincial commissions rapidly adopted it. The 
initiative allows issuers to raise capital in a cost-effective manner without the requirement to 
prepare a prospectus.  As discussed in the JCPP analysis above, alternative models to the current 
regulatory structure could accommodate such initiatives.   
 
 
(e)  Saskatchewan Local Policy 45-601 Community Venture Exemption  
  
The Saskatchewan Securities Commission (SSC) created the Community Venture 
Exemption in 1993 as Local Policy 45-601 (the “Community Venture Exemption”).129  It allows 
issuers to raise up to $1 million in a small geographical area of Saskatchewan to fund the 
creation or development of a “Community Venture” that can provide jobs in, or economic 
development of, the community.130 The basis for the exemption is that securities are sold only to 
local residents involved in the project who do not need a prospectus because of their personal 
knowledge regarding the issuer and the investment.  
 
While the policy exempts issuers from preparing a prospectus, issuers must provide 
investors with an offering document.  The securities regulators in Saskatchewan have prepared a 
“fill in the blanks” offering document for this purpose.   
 
The Securities Division of the Saskatchewan Financial Services Commission (SFSC) has 
indicated that these exemptions have been used successfully by Saskatchewan farmers for the 
development of local hog farms and grain terminals.131  Senior staff at the SFSC indicated that 
more than a dozen large grain terminals in Saskatchewan began their operations using these 
exemptions, and subsequently conducted prospectus offerings to raise additional capital. The 
                                                 
129 This policy came into force on April 2, 1993.  This policy replaced Local Policy 5.1, which came into force in 
1987 with no substantive changes from the previous policy. 
130 The Securities Act (1988) Saskatchewan Policy Statement 45-601, Part 3. 
131 Quadra Investment Group was cited by the SFSC as an example of how issuers can successfully rely on these 
local exemptions to start up multiple hog farms in Saskatchewan. Quadra would set up a joint venture with local 
residents and then use the exemptions to raise up to $2 million capital to start up the venture: Interview with 
Dean Murrison, Acting Deputy Director, Registration, Securities Division, SFSC (July 18, 2003).  In 
November 2000, all of Quadra’s 14 hog farms amalgamated into Community Pork Inc., a TSX-listed company.  
See generally, R. Wright, “Quadra Group and Community Pork Ventures: An Evolution” (2002) (on file 
with author). 
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SFSC indicated that the ability to raise inexpensive capital at an early stage in the business cycle 
of these issuers was directly attributable to these exemptions.  
 
Analysis and Relationship to Optimal Regulatory Structure:  
 
Saskatchewan’s Community Venture Exemption is an example of a local rule that 
appears to respond to distinctive local issues and interests. This local rule has been in existence 
for several years and, unlike the other local regulatory initiatives analyzed in this part of the 
study, it has not experienced multilateral or national adoption.   
 
The current regulatory system allows for local regulators to formulate local policies of 
this sort to respond to local interests. The USL model as proposed by the CSA would also allow 
for local rules, but only on an exceptional basis.  A passport model would presumably also allow 
provincial commissions to create local rules for local needs.  
 
A single regulator model, in theory, poses the greatest challenge for local rules to be 
created to respond to distinctive local interests and issues.  One can imagine that it would be 
much more difficult for Saskatchewan farmers to attract the attention of a single regulator than 
under the current system, where they have (or are perceived to have) a more ready audience with 
the provincial securities regulator.  As a result, a single regulator model may need to allow for 
a limited role for distinctive local rules by local regulators.  
 
Interestingly, the SFSC is of the opinion that MI 45-103 will likely supersede the 
Community Venture Exemption.132 This result is foreseeable given the fact that MI 45-103’s 
offering memorandum exemption is not industry specific and is broad enough to accommodate 
the financing needs of these issuers.    
 
The SFSC’s views on the prospects of the Community Venture Exemption are instructive 
in determining whether the adoption of a local rule is necessary and whether it responds to a 
distinctive local market or interest.  Is the Community Venture Exemption about the 
development of a distinctly local industry or economy? In this case, it has assisted in the 
development of hog farms and grain terminals in Saskatchewan, but Alberta and Manitoba also 
have hog farms and grain terminals, which suggests that these industries are not a local interest.  
 
Another factor to consider is whether one can reasonably make a generalization that the 
underlying rationale for the exemption is to allow issuers to raise capital in a cost effective 
manner.  In this case, the fact that many of the hog farms grew and listed on the TSX, suggests 
that the local aspect of the business may be for a limited period of time, and at some point, the 
issuer becomes a small-medium sized business, like any other, that is concerned, among other 
things, about raising capital at low cost.133  As the SFSC has noted, the more general exemptions 
in MI 45-103 will likely serve the needs of the local market that has previously been served by 
this exemption.134 This above analysis suggests that by generalizing the underlying rationale of 
                                                 
132 Interview with Dean Murrison, Acting Deputy Director, Registration, Securities Division, SFSC 




a proposed local rule, a uniform or national rule of broader application might serve as an 
effective response.   
 
(f) Relationship to Regulatory Innovation  
 
Most of the local regulatory responses discussed in this section are not the responses to 
distinct local and regional markets, although they may support the case for local regulatory 
innovation and experimentation. 
 
While not central to the objectives of this study, a relevant question in considering 
optimal regulatory structure is the extent to which alternative regulatory models would produce 
the same or greater levels of innovation as the current system.  
 
While there is some scope for innovation under the current system because provincial 
securities regulators can experiment within their own jurisdictions, issuers engaged in 
interprovincial securities offerings cannot take advantage of innovations that are only available 
in one province, as they need to comply with the laws of the strictest jurisdiction.  Hence, 
provincial regulators do not have proper incentives to achieve maximum utility for issuers, 
ex ante, to be innovative on matters that require interprovincial agreement. On the other hand, 
provincial regulators do have proper incentives to experiment and engage in innovation with 
respect to early-stage issuers that are engaged in securities activity often entirely within only 
one province, for example, in the context of prospectus exemptions. 
 
A passport model (either based on issuer headquarters or issuer choice) would allow 
for greater innovation and experimentation than the current system in all areas of securities 
regulation because provincial regulators presumably would not need to obtain agreement or 
consent on specific matters for issuers subject to their jurisdiction to take advantage of innovative 
products in relation to interprovincial securities activity. However, beyond a certain point, 
innovation may threaten the base level of harmonization that appears to be necessary for a 
passport model to operate. 
 
A key assumption that often underlies an assessment of innovation and alternative 
regulatory models is that “more heads are better than one.” Specifically, with respect to 
achieving the optimal level of innovation, it is often assumed that the greater the number of 
institutions that analyze an issue, the greater the quality and quantity of ideas that will emerge. 
However, a single regulator could lead to equal or greater levels of innovation than the current 
system. The assumption that more heads are better than one and lead to more innovation is not 
entirely valid in this context.  To the extent that LICRs for certain industries exist in more than 
one province, a single regulator could consolidate that expertise. To the extent that there is no 
critical mass of issuers in any one locale and hence no clearly identifiable LICR for certain 
industries, current regulators likely do not have much expertise in those industries and hence are 
not being innovative in respect of those industries. A single regulator would allow for a 
consolidation of scattered expertise.      
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4. Other Developments in Canada Capital Markets 
 
This part analyzes other developments in the Canadian capital markets that affect the 
analysis of local and regional issues in the determination of optimal regulatory structure.   
 
(a)  Consolidation of Stock Exchanges  
 
The consolidation of stock exchanges in Canada reveals a great deal about the power of 
globalization and market forces in re-shaping the capital markets framework in Canada.135 The 
merger of five regional stock exchanges into three, each with specialized expertise, suggests that 
the capital markets in Canada are increasingly national, as opposed to regional, in character.136  
These market forces might propel a similar rationalization of the securities regulatory structure 
in Canada at the level of the securities commissions.    
 
The merger of the VSE and the ASC into the CDNX in 1999 may provide some useful 
lessons for reform at the securities regulator level.  
 
Stakeholders have different views on the success of this merger. Some stakeholders were 
of the view that the merger of the two exchanges was successful.  They were pleased with the 
flexibility and the discretion that local offices were given to interpret and apply the CDNX rule 
book (which involved a merger of the rule books of the VSE and the ASE) differently in the 
two offices of the exchange (Vancouver and Calgary) based on the different issuer base 
(mining versus oil and gas) and the different regulatory concerns that each industry presents.  
 
Other stakeholders were of the view that the merger of the stock exchanges was rash and 
that the rule books were poorly integrated.  They expressed the concern that the rule book is 
being administered differently in the Vancouver office as compared to the Calgary office. These 
stakeholders suggested that more time and thought should have been put into the merger prior to 
it taking place, but recognized that these issues will likely resolve themselves over time. 
 
The main lesson to be learned from the merger of the VSE and ASE for the current 
debate on optimal regulatory structure at the level of securities commissions is that the possibility 
of varying application at the local level of uniform national rules must be acknowledged or 
addressed.   
 
(b)  The Role of the CSA and the Uniform Securities Legislation Project  
 
This section describes the role of the CSA, its initiatives in respect of harmonization, and 
the Uniform Securities Legislation Project (USL Project).  
 
                                                 
135 For a history of the stock exchange rationalization process in Canada, see Appendix C. 
136 In its submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee, the TSX Group notes that “the broader secular changes that 
have created this new situation essentially involve new global imperatives insinuating themselves into a market 
governed within the bounds of a regulatory framework that was and is primarily local in its preoccupations.”  
TSX Group Inc., submission to WPC.  The Canadian Bankers Association stated in this regard: “the market 
recognized the need for economies of scale in the face of international competition and regulators allowed the 
needed changes to take place.”  Canadian Bankers Association, submission to WPC.   
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The CSA is an umbrella organization representing the 13 provincial and territorial 
securities commissions. It is an informal body that functions through meetings, conference calls 
and day-to-day cooperation among its members. Funding and support comes from the member 
commissions on a voluntary basis. The CSA’s purpose is to coordinate and harmonize regulation 
of the Canadian capital markets.137 Its mission is to foster fair and efficient capital markets while 
protecting investors from unfair, improper and fraudulent practices.138  Even though the CSA is 
criticized as being slow and inefficient, its initiatives in respect of coordination and 
harmonization to date have been quite significant.139     
 
The CSA’s USL Project was initiated in 2001 and is scheduled to be ready for adoption 
across Canada by 2004. The project is part of a broader CSA strategy that aims to: 1) reduce the 
regulatory burden on market participants; and 2) make regulation more effective in protecting 
investors and market integrity.140  
 
The objective of the USL Project is to eliminate the differences in provincial and 
territorial securities laws by developing a uniform act and uniform rules for adoption by each 
jurisdiction of Canada.141 
 
The CSA’s Blueprint states: “Since the USL Project is a harmonization initiative, the 
resulting Uniform Act and Uniform Rules would contain few substantive differences from 
current securities laws.”142  However, the CSA’s USL allows for local rules that take into 
account local markets. The Blueprint states:  
 
Where a harmonized approach may not be appropriate, the majority 
position would be set out in the Uniform Act and Uniform Rules. Local 
differences would be set out by way of exceptions in a local provincial or 
territorial rule (Local Rule) or the relevant Administration Act, 
[anticipating] that the use of Local Rules would be exceptional and 
infrequent. Local Rules would be reviewed regularly to ensure that they 
reflect obvious local needs rather than theoretical differences.143   
                                                 
137 The CSA coordinates securities regulation initiatives on a national scale, leaving enforcement and 
complaint handling to provincial and territorial jurisdiction. As noted on the CSA website at 
http://www.csa-acvm.ca/html_CSA/about_who_are_csa.html, “this provides a more direct and efficient 
service since each regulator is closer to its local investors and market participants.” 
138 See http://www.csa-acvm.ca/pdfs/CSA_Strategic_Plan-2002.pdf. 
139 See Blueprint for Uniform Securities Law for Canada (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2003), online at 
http://www.gov.ns.ca/nssc/docs/conceptproposal.pdf.  CSA has developed: national instruments and national 
policies in areas including prospectus requirements, mutual fund regulation, rights offerings, take-over bids, and 
marketplace operations; the Mutual Reliance Review System (“MRRS”) for prospectus vetting and exemptive 
relief; the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (“SEDAR”), which makes available on the 
Internet public documents filed by reporting issuers; the National Registration Database (“NRD”), a web-based 
system that allows dealers and advisors to file registration forms electronically; and the System for Electronic 
Disclosure by Insiders (“SEDI”), a central electronic system for insider reporting that was made operational in 
May, 2003. 





The Blueprint does not state what appropriate local rules would be and why they would 
be necessary.  The factors that were set out in Part 4 above to determine whether a local rule is 
necessary and responds to a distinct local interest or market ought to be used in this analysis.  
 
Even though local regulators claim that mining is a local concern, it is telling that the 
Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC), the national association for the 
mining industry, is not in favour of the concept of local rules. It states:  
 
In our submissions on the draft USL legislation, we disagreed with the 
need for local rules. Local Rules should not be permitted to change the 
substantive provisions of securities legislation. Issuers need to be able to 
look to one source to determine the relevant securities regime across the 
country. Having to check in each case for Local Rules would result in 
complication, delay and expense.144 
 
PDAC appears to be arguing that the benefits of any local rules would be outweighed 
by the costs incurred by issuers (and ultimately passed down to investors) in complying with 
multiple sources of regulation. 
 
(c)  BCSC’s Deregulation Project: New Proposals for Securities Regulation145 
 
The BCSC has initiated a two-year project with the aim of streamlining and simplifying 
the B.C. Securities Act as a response to the provincial Liberal government’s call for all 
government bodies to reduce their regulations by one-third.146  
 
BCSC Chair Douglas Hyndman has identified three sources of regulatory burden: (1) 
differences in regulatory requirements among jurisdictions; (2) separate decision-making 
processes in each jurisdiction; and (3) the volume and complexity of regulatory requirements.147 
He notes that the current national focus on addressing the first two issues has negatively affected 
the third issue. The BCSC’s response in the form of a deregulation project is aimed at making 
regulation less complex and burdensome and more effective in achieving the goals of investor 
protection and market integrity.148  
 
The BCSC discussion paper, New Proposals for Securities Regulation proposes key 
changes in respect of continuous market access (CMA), registration, investor remedies and  
                                                 
144 Presentation on the Inter-Provincial Securities Initiative by the Prospectors and Developers Association of 
Canada, online at http://www.pdac.ca/pdac/sr/030715.html. 
145 See New Proposals for Securities Regulation (Vancouver: British Columbia Securities Commission, 2002) 
at 69. 
146 British Columbia Securities Commission Annual Report 2001-02, online at 
http://www.gov.bc.ca/cas/down/2001_02_annual_reports/bcsc_ar_2001_02.pdf. 
147 Speech dated October 9, 2002, online at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/Publications/Hyndman_EconomicClub.pdf. 
148 Ibid. 
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enforcement and public interest powers.149 The BCSC is also proposing ways to simplify the 
province’s mutual fund regulation. 
 
The BCSC Deregulation Project was undertaken in conjunction with the USL project 
described in the preceding section. While the BCSC proposed that its changes be adopted 
nationally by all provincial securities commissions, the other CSA members appear to have 
rejected the proposal for now.  
 
The policy goals of the BCSC’s proposals are certainly laudable,150 but the proposals 
appear to contradict the CSA’s USL project, because the BCSC’s implementation of its 
proposals will result in a wider divide in regulatory requirements between jurisdictions.  The 
BCSC CMA model does present an “interface” for issuers that wish to conduct inter-provincial 
offerings such that the BCSC will recognize compliance with the laws of a foreign jurisdiction 
(which includes other Canadian provinces) for the purpose of compliance with the B.C. system 
so that issuers will not have to comply with inconsistent regulatory requirements.151 
 
However, other provincial commissions have yet to indicate that they will recognize the 
B.C. proposed model. Until they do, issuers will only benefit from the cost savings associated 
with CMA if they engage in an exclusively intra-provincial offering (with both the issuer being 
headquartered in B.C. and all investors being located in B.C.) or wait until all provincial 
securities commission adopt or recognize B.C.’s CMA model. 
 
Chair Douglas Hyndman and his senior staff emphasized that the proposals are not a 
regulatory response to distinct local or regional markets.152 They emphasized that the proposals 
are a “top-down” initiative based on the BCSC’s view of how securities markets should be 
regulated.  The fact that the BCSC invited other securities commissions to participate in the new 
framework, and that other provincial regulators acknowledged that the proposals had some 
merit,153 (although they decided that their priorities in respect of securities regulatory reform lay 
elsewhere) also suggests that the proposals are not a local regulatory initiative in response to 
distinct local markets or issues. 
 
                                                 
149 The concepts were based on five guiding principles: (1) keep the right balance between regulatory restrictions 
and market freedom; (2) make the rules as simple and clear as possible; (3) foster a culture of compliance in 
industry; (4) act decisively against misconduct; and (5) equip investors with self-protection tools.  See also 
http://www.share.ca/files/newsletters/prospectus3.pdf.  
150 The Investment Dealers Association of Canada has voiced its support of the B.C. proposals, stating that 
“The BCSC initiative stands out by recognizing that improved disclosure, the harmonization of rules across 
provincial jurisdictions and tougher enforcement can be achieved not only through fewer and better-focused 
rules, but by shifting emphasis to the judicial and quasi-judicial system to impose a discipline on market 
participants.”  Investment Dealers Association of Canada, submission to WPC.  Also, Discovery Capital 
Corporation commented in its submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee that Canadian securities regulation 
must tolerate the testing of innovative regulatory solutions, such as the B.C. model, on a pilot basis within 
regions.  Discovery Capital Corporation, submission to WPC. 
151 New Proposals for Securities Regulation, supra note 145, at 70-72. 
152 Meeting with BCSC Chair Douglas Hyndman and his senior staff on June 16, 2003. 
153 See Letter from D. Brown to D. Hyndman (27 June 2003), online at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/About/News/Speeches/spch_20030627_brown-re-bcsc.pdf. 
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While the B.C. proposal is not a response to distinct local markets, it may be an example 
of regulatory innovation that may ultimately be adopted or recognized by other provincial 
commissions, not unlike the other regulatory initiatives discussed in Part 4. 
 
5. The U.S. Approach  
 
This part highlights the approach of the SEC in addressing local and regional issues in 
its securities regulatory structure.  In particular, this part highlights the roles and 
responsibilities of the SEC’s district and regional offices as well as the mandate of the SEC’s 
small business office. This part does not focus on the issue of federal-state interaction in respect 
of securities regulation, which is dealt with in detail by Professor Joel Seligman in a separate 
study commissioned by the Wise Persons’ Committee.154  
 
(a)  District and Regional Offices 
 
Aside from its Washington, DC headquarters, the SEC has 10 regional and district offices 
throughout the country.155  The four regional offices report up to the different divisions at the 
headquarters in Washington.  The SEC’s six district offices report to four regional offices.  
Approximately 1400 staff members work at the regional and district offices, which represents 
approximately one-third of the SEC’s total staff.156  
 
The regional and district offices are primarily responsible for enforcement (including the 
investigation of securities fraud and cases involving market intermediaries) and examination 
(of market intermediaries such as investment dealers and investment advisors.) These 
two responsibilities are split about evenly in most regional offices.157  The regional offices do 
about 95% of the SEC’s examinations and inspections work, and about 70% of the SEC’s 
enforcement work. 
 
In completing their work, regional office staff work in teams that include staff from 
SEC headquarters. As well, regional office staff work closely with self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs) such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 
 
The regulation of stock exchanges, however, is primarily handled by SEC staff at 
headquarters, with secondary assistance from the regional offices. For example, in overseeing the 
New York Stock Exchange (the NYSE), senior examiners from the Northeast Regional Office in 
New York City assist staff from SEC’s Washington headquarters.158 
 
                                                 
154 Joel Seligman, “The United States Federal-State Model of Securities Regulation” (WPC Research Study, 2003). 
155 See Appendix D. 
156 Interview with Jim Clarkson, Director, Regional Office Assistance and Program Management, Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Elizabeth Jacobs, Assistant Director. Office of International Affairs, Securities and 




The Division of Enforcement159 in Washington oversees the enforcement activities of the 
regional offices.  The Director of the Division of Enforcement decides on priorities, which are 
communicated to the regional office heads at regular meetings.160  The heads of the regional 
office provide input on issues that are indigenous to their regions. 
 
In respect of enforcement, all staff must obtain the approval of a five-member 
commission161 prior to commencing an investigation or filing an action. All staff must also 
obtain the approval of this commission prior to settlement of any action that is being settled for 
less than the full remedy that was sought.  
 
Prior to appearing before the five-member commission, “action memos” must be sent to 
the “Office of the General Counsel”162 which ensures that the file is consistent with the direction 
that the Commissioners are taking.  Staff from the Office of the General Counsel is responsible 
for particular regional offices, and build relationships with those offices.163   
 
Once an investigation begins, it is under the control of the regional or district office. 
These offices are responsible for taking testimony, negotiating settlements, and so forth.  As a 
result, the offices have a great deal of autonomy for investigation and enforcement and can do a 
lot of work without approval or authorization from the SEC’s headquarters.164   
 
In respect of examinations, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations165 
(OCIE) serves the same role as the Division of Enforcement at SEC headquarters.  This division 
develops national policies for the regional offices.  At the beginning of the year, senior staff from 
the OCIE meet with senior staff of the regional offices to develop priorities.166   
 
                                                 
159 The Division of Enforcement investigates possible violations of securities laws, recommends Commission 
action when appropriate, either in a federal court or before an administrative law judge, and negotiates 
settlements on behalf of the Commission. While the SEC has civil enforcement authority only, it works closely 
with various criminal law enforcement agencies throughout the country to develop and bring criminal cases 
when the misconduct warrants more severe action.  See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce.shtml. 
160 Interview with Jim Clarkson and Elizabeth Jacobs, supra note 156. 
161 See http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner.shtml. 
162 The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Commission. Primary duties of the Office include 
representing the SEC in certain civil, private, or appellate proceedings, preparing legislative material, and 
providing independent advice and assistance to the Commission, the Divisions, and the Offices. Through its 
amicus curiae program, the Office often intervenes in private appellate litigation involving novel or important 
interpretations of the securities laws.  See http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#org. 
163 Interview with Jim Clarkson and Elizabeth Jacobs, supra note 156. 
164 Ibid. 
165 The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations administers the SEC's nationwide examination and 
inspection program for registered self-regulatory organizations, broker-dealers, transfer agents, clearing 
agencies, investment companies, and investment advisers. The Office conducts inspections to foster compliance 
with the securities laws, to detect violations of the law, and to keep the Commission informed of developments 
in the regulated community. Among the more important goals of the examination program is the quick and 
informal correction of compliance problems. When the Office finds deficiencies, it issues a "deficiency letter" 
identifying the problems that need to be rectified and monitor the situation until compliance is achieved. 
Violations that appear too serious for informal correction are referred to the Division of Enforcement.  
See http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#org. 
166 Interview with Jim Clarkson and Elizabeth Jacobs, supra note 156. 
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SEC headquarters reviews regional examination reports for the purposes of quality 
control, but regional offices have autonomy in conducting examinations, writing reports and 
making deficiency reports, if necessary.167 
 
There are “subject matter experts” in Washington who provide guidance and counsel 
in respect of legal questions.  Policy work is finalized in Washington, but in drafting rules, 
Washington seeks the input of the regional offices.168 
 
Regional and district offices interact frequently with the state securities commissioners.  
They share information, send and receive enforcement referrals and meet regularly during the 
year. At these meetings, the SEC hears the state regulators’ concerns and conveys its own 
regulatory and enforcement concerns.169  For examinations, joint “exam summits” take place at 
which senior state examination officers, SROs and regional office examination staff discuss the 
examination of market intermediaries and develop coordinated sweeps. 
 
Regional and district offices house regional regulatory expertise. For example, the Boston 
and Philadelphia District Offices focus on the investment management industry and receive a 
disproportionate share of the SEC’s resources devoted to regulating the investment management 
industry, due to the very large population of investment management that takes place in those 
cities.170   
 
Hiring for regional and district offices is done locally, and local offices have authority to 
emphasize recruiting and hiring in industries that are important to that region.171  
 
Local and regional offices do not review corporate filings. Washington headquarters 
handles review of corporate filings.172  
 
Most regional offices were established at the same time that the SEC was created.  The 
key rationale for setting them up was that SEC staff should be physically close to the firms that 
they are regulating and to the state authorities with which they work. The SEC has, on occasion, 
closed certain offices and expanded others, based on changing workloads and priorities.173  
 
(b) The SEC’s Small Business Office 
 
The SEC has undertaken several initiatives to be responsive to the needs of small 
businesses. Most importantly, the SEC has created a unit entitled the Office of Small Business, a 
unit that is under the control of the Corporate Finance division. This unit, housed in Washington 
D.C., specializes in small company filings and the needs of small businesses, including crafting 
                                                 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 See also, H.H. Mackens, “An American State-Federal Perspective on the Proposals” (1981) 19 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 424 at 428.   





rules to lessen the burden of the SEC’s regulation on these issuers.174 The SEC’s definition of 
“small business” includes firms with less than $5 million in net assets. 175 
 
The SEC’s website also has a section devoted to providing guidance to small issuers, 
which contains the text of a number of forms and regulations of interest to smaller issuers. 176    
 
Since 1996, the SEC has also held a number of town hall meetings with small businesses 
throughout the United States. These meetings convey basic information to small businesses 
about raising capital through public markets. These meetings also allow the SEC to learn more 
about the concerns and problems facing small businesses in raising capital so that programs can 
be designed to meet their needs. 
 
The SEC also participates in the annual Government-Business Forum on Small Business 
Capital Formation, mandated by the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980. 177 It is 
the only government-sponsored national conference for smaller issuers, and offers a yearly 
opportunity for small businesses to provide government officials with input on how regulatory 
requirements affect their ability to raise capital.  Past conferences have developed numerous 
recommendations for legislative and regulatory changes in the areas of taxation, securities and 
financial services regulation and state and federal assistance.  
 
At the 2003 Government-Business Forum, the corporation finance working group 
discussed the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002178 on small companies.179  What 
emerged from the conference is that small companies may be less inclined to pursue public 
offerings or voluntarily register as public companies, given the increased cost of compliance with 
the new rules. As well, compliance with the new rules might be too burdensome for currently 
reporting smaller companies given their more limited resources.  As a result of the concerns 
expressed, the SEC staff noted that there was a need to monitor and assess the impact of the new 




This study finds that LICRs exist for certain industries and levels of market capitalization. 
This study finds that Alberta hosts an LICR for oil and gas, B.C. hosts an LICR for micro-cap 
issuers, and Ontario hosts an LICR for financial services. Certain LICRs exist in more than one 
province:  Both B.C. and Ontario host LICRs for mining; Ontario, Quebec and B.C. for 
communications and media; Ontario and Quebec for life sciences; and B.C., Alberta and Ontario 
each host an LICR for small cap issuers.  
 
                                                 
174 United States, Securities and Exchange Commission (2000) at 23-24, online at 
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/cfcr112k.pdf. 
175 See Letter from U.S. Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy to J. Katz (August 19, 2002).  
176 Online at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm. 
177 Online at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum.shtml. 
178 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763. 
179 United States, Final Report: 2003 Conference on Federal-State Securities Regulation (2003) at 2-3. 
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However, the existence of LICRs for certain industries does not allow us to conclude that 
the economic activity associated with these industries is local to host provinces or that host 
provinces have distinct local interests in the capital markets regulation or general regulation of 
those industries. 
 
The activities of issuers concentrated within an LICR have an impact outside the 
geographic boundaries of the province that hosts and regulates the LICR.  Other provinces may 
have an interest equal to that of the regulating province, given investor location and the 
importance of those industries to the economies of other provinces, as borne out by GDP data. 
 
 Having found that LICRs for certain industries and levels of market capitalization exist in 
Canada, the issue that follows is whether provincial securities commissions that host an LICR 
identified in this study are responsive to that infrastructure in a manner that is different than other 
provincial securities commissions that do not host that LICR.  
 
 The Saskatchewan Community Venture Local Policy may be a legitimate example of a 
local policy serving distinct local needs and hence, underscore may support the importance of 
provincial regulation of distinctive local and regional markets. However, most locally-developed 
policies and regulatory approaches examined in this study have experienced relatively rapid 
multilateral or national adoption.  In addition, most locally- developed policies studied in this 
report have been (a) in relation to industries that are national, not local, in character; (b) in 
response to concerns of investors located throughout the country; and (c) industry-neutral rules 
that allow issuers to raise capital in a cost-effective manner.   
 
Overall, the analysis in this study finds that the majority of local regulatory responses are 
not the product of local and regional distinctiveness. As a result, the main conclusion to be drawn 
from the study is that existing local and regional differences can be accommodated under 
different regulatory models without appreciable differences in regulatory outcomes. 
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Appendix A – The Decomposition of Gross Domestic Product by Province 
Table 1a – The Decomposition of GDP in Alberta 
 
      1997 Constant Dollars Percent of Total
GDP of Alberta (Millions of Dollars)     
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting  $2,294 1.9%
2. Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction   $20,527 17.1%
3. Utilities      $2,881 2.4%
4. Construction     $9,461 7.9%
5. Manufacturing     $11,204 9.3%
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade    $12,667 10.6%
7. Transportation and Warehousing   $6,601 5.5%
8. Information and Cultural Industries   $4,408 3.7%
9. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Renting  $20,361 17.0%
10. Educational Services    $4,605 3.8%
11. Healthcare and Social Assistance   $4,920 4.1%
12. Public Administration    $4,892 4.1%
13. Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation   $773 0.6%
14. Administrative and Support Services   $1,987 2%
15. Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services  $6,385 5%
16. Other Services         $6,079     5%




Table 1b – The Decomposition of GDP in  British Columbia 
 
      1997 Constant Dollars Percent of Total
GDP of  British Columbia (Millions of Dollars)  
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting  $4,367 4%
2. Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction   $3,203 3%
3. Utilities      $2,507 2%
4. Construction     $5,804 5%
5. Manufacturing     $12,249 10%
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade    $13,418 11%
7. Transportation and Warehousing   $6,763 6%
8. Information and Cultural Industries   $5,446 5%
9. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Renting  $27,144 23%
10. Educational Services    $6,120 5%
11. Healthcare and Social Assistance   $7,898 7%
12. Public Administration    $6,195 5%
13. Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation   $1,329 1%
14. Administrative and Support Services   $2,321 2%
15. Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services  $5,009 4%
16. Other Services         $7,116     6%




Table 1c – The Decomposition of GDP in Northwest Territories (N.W.T.) 
  
      1997 Constant Dollars Percent of Total
GDP of N.W.T. (Millions of Dollars)     
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting  $12 0.4%
2. Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction   $766 28.3%
3. Construction     $584 21.6%
4. Utilities      $38 1.4%
5. Manufacturing     $9 0.3%
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade    $184 6.8%
7. Transportation and Warehousing   $149 5.5%
8. Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   $325 12.0%
9. Healthcare and Social Assistance   $107 3.9%
10. Public Administration    $330 12%
11. Other Services        $201   7.4%




Table 1d – The Decomposition of GDP in Newfoundland 
 
      1997 Constant Dollars Percent of Total
GDP of Newfoundland (Millions of Dollars)   
1. Agriculture       $412 3.3%
2. Forestry and Logging    99 0.8%
3. Fishing and Trapping    $247 2.0%
4. Mining and Oil Extraction    $2,255 17.9%
5. Manufacturing     $724 5.7%
6. Construction     $567 4.5%
7. Utilities      470 3.7%
8. Wholesale and retail trade    $1,252 9.9%
9. Transportation and Warehousing   $467 4%
10. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Renting and Leasing 1,920 15.2%
11. Educational Services    $784 6.2%
12. Healthcare and Social Assistance   $1,024 8.1%
13. Public Administration    $1,102 8.7%
14. Information and Cultural    $598 4.7%
15. Other Services     $688 5.5%




Table 1e – The Decomposition of GDP in Saskatchewan 
 
     1997 Constant Dollars Percent of Total
GDP of Saskatchewan (Millions of Dollars)  
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting $1,742 6%
2. Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction  $4,006 14%
3. Manufacturing    $2,054 7%
4. Construction    $1,239 4%
5. Transportation, Warehousing and Utilities $2,485 9%
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade   $3,245 12%
7. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Renting and Leasing $4,843 17%
8. Information and Cultural industries  $1,009 4%
9. Education, Healthcare, and Social Assistance $3,293 12%
10. Public Administration   $1,693 6%
11. Other Service Industries    $2,506     9%
TOTAL      $28,114 100%
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Table 1f – The Decomposition of GDP in Ontario 
 
     1997 Constant Dollars Percent of Total
GDP of Ontario (Millions of Dollars)   
1. Agriculture      $4,510 1%
2. Forestry and Logging   $874 0.2%
3. Fishing and Trapping   $16 0.0%
4. Mining and Oil Extraction   $2,952 1%
5. Utilities     $10,460 3%
6. Construction    $20,779 5%
7. Manufacturing    $83,849 20%
8. Wholesale and Retail Trade   $50,688 12%
9. Transportation and Warehousing  $15,756 4%
10. Information and Cultural   $19,665 5%
11. Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate  $88,628 22%
12. Health and Education   $40,422 10%
13. Other Services      $72,982   18%




Table 1g – The Decomposition of GDP in Quebec 
 
     1997 Constant Dollars Percent of Total
GDP of Quebec (Millions of Dollars)   
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting $3,787 2%
2. Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction  $1,587 1%
3. Utilities     $8,802 4%
4. Construction    $10,763 5%
5. Manufacturing    $45,213 21%
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade   $24,448 11%
7. Transportation and Warehousing  $9,395 4%
8. Information and Cultural   $10,991 5%
9. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Renting and Leasing $36,877 17%
10. Health and Education   $22,987 11%
11. Other Services      $38,953   18%
TOTAL     $213,803 100%
Source: Statistics Canada – CANSIM 
 
Appendix B – Regional and Sectoral Representation of Canadian Issuers180 
 
Table 1a – Regional and Sectoral Representation of TSX-Listed Issuers 
 
Total Alberta Percentage of 
Sectoral Total 
British 
Columbia Percentage of 
Sectoral Total 
Manitoba Percentage of 
Sectoral Total 
New 
Brunswick Percentage of 
Sectoral Total 
Total 1222 233  177  24  2  
          
Communications and Media 67  5 7% 6 9% 3 4% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  2%  3%  13%  0%  
          
Diversified Industries 339 57 17% 40 12% 8 2% 1 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  24%  23%  33%  50%  
          
Financial Services 243 16 7% 5 2% 9 4% 1 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  7%  3%  38%  50%  
          
Forest Products 26 0 0% 12 46% 1 4% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  7%  4%  0%  
          
Life Sciences  73 5 7% 14 19% 2 3% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  2%  8%  8%  0%  
          
Mining  159 5 3% 63 40% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  2%  36%  0%  0%  
          
Oil & Gas 123 113 92% 5 4% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  48%  3%  0%  0%  
          
Real Estate  41 10 24% 7 17% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  4%  4%  0%  0%  
          
Technology 128 10 8% 24 19% 1 1% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  4%  14%  4%  0%  
          
Utilities and Pipelines 23 12 52% 1 4% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  5%  1%  0%  0%  
 
Source: Raw Data from Toronto Stock Exchange (at May 31, 2003) 
                                                 
180 Certain columns and/or rows in Appendix B tables may not add up to 100% because foreign issuers headquartered outside of Canada are not represented on 
the tables.  
 
 
Table 1a – Regional and Sectoral Representation of TSX-Listed Issuers (Continued) 
 








Scotia Percentage of 
Sectoral Total
Ontario Percentage of 
Sectoral Total
Quebec Percentage of 
Sectoral Total
Saskatchewan Percentage of 
Sectoral Total
Total 6  1  18  577  177  7  
             
Communications and Media 1 1% 0 0% 3 4% 31 46% 18 27% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 17%  0%  17%  5%  10%  0%  
             
Diversified Industries 3 1% 1 0% 6 2% 155 46% 65 19% 3 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 50%  100%  33%  27%  37%  43%  
             
Financial Services 1 0% 0 0% 2 1% 193 79% 16 7% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 17%  0%  11%  33%  9%  0%  
             
Forest Products 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 15% 9 35% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  1%  5%  0%  
             
Life Sciences  0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 27 37% 25 34% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  5%  14%  0%  
             
Mining  0 0% 0 0% 2 1% 68 43% 18 11% 3 2% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  11%  12%  10%  43%  
             
Oil & Gas 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 2% 1 1% 1 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  1%  1%  14%  
             
Real Estate  0 0% 0 0% 3 7% 19 46% 2 5% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  17%  3%  1%  0%  
             
Technology 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 74 58% 19 15% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  13%  11%  0%  
             
Utilities and Pipelines 1 0% 0 0% 2 9% 3 13% 4 17% 0 0% 
















Brunswick Percentage of 
Sectoral Total 
Total 2,041 440  983  18  6  
          
Communications and Media 29  5 17% 14 48% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  1%  0%  0%  
          
Diversified Industries 335 81 24% 111 33% 3 1% 3 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total  4%  11%  17%  50%  
          
Financial Services 81 17 21% 25 31% 2 2% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  1%  3%  11%  0%  
          
Forest Products 1 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  0%  0%  0%  
          
Mining  918 77 8% 584 64% 6 1% 1 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  4%  59%  33%  17%  
          
Oil & Gas 282 173 61% 89 32% 1 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  8%  9%  6%  0%  
          
Real Estate  61 22 36% 16 26% 2 3% 1 2% 
Percent of Provincial Total  1%  2%  11%  17%  
          
Technology 324 62 19% 139 43% 4 1% 1 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  3%  14%  22%  17%  
          
Utilities and Pipelines 10 3 30% 4 40% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  0%  0%  0%  
 
 







Territories Percentage of Sectoral 
Total 
Nova 











Total 9  1  16  415  142  11  
             
Communications and Media 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 9 31% 1 3% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  2%  1%  0%  
             
Diversified Industries 1 0% 1 0% 0 0% 101 30% 31 9% 3 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 11%  100%  0%  24%  22%  27%  
             
Financial Services 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 32 40% 4 5% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  6%  8%  3%  0%  
             
Forest Products 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  
             
Mining  7 1% 0 0% 5 1% 168 18% 66 7% 4 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 78%  0%  31%  40%  46%  36%  
             
Oil & Gas 1 0% 0 0% 4 1% 12 4% 1 0% 1 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 11%  0%  25%  3%  1%  9%  
             
Real Estate  0 0% 0 0% 2 3% 13 21% 4 7% 1 2% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  13%  3%  3%  9%  
             
Technology 0 0% 0 0% 4 1% 78 24% 34 10% 2 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  25%  19%  24%  18%  
             
Utilities and Pipelines 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 20% 1 10% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%  
 
Source: Raw Data from TSX Venture Exchange (at July 7, 2003)  
 
Table 1c – Market Capitalization of TSX-Listed Issuers 
















Total $922,994,659,202 177,789,567,775  45,229,873,133  30,232,642,383  275,722,708  2,063,467,490  
            
Communications and 100,550,211,465 4,062,445,514 4% 7,620,397,323 8% 3,177,706,260 3% 0 0% 88,397,919 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  2%  17%  11%  0%  4%  
Number of Issuers 67 5  6  3  0  1  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 1,500,749,425 812,489,103  1,270,066,220  1,059,235,420  0  88,397,919  
            
Diversified Industries 226,728,836,046 27,289,129,636 12% 6,997,700,729 3% 1,285,708,642 1% 63,135,508 0% 751,313,010 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  15%  15%  4%  23%  36%  
Number of Issuers 339 57  40  8  1  3  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 668,816,626 478,756,660  174,942,518  160,713,580  63,135,508  250,437,670  
            
Financial Services 292,411,479,885 5,857,275,157 2% 375,453,499 0% 24,235,439,011 8% 212,587,200 0% 265,000,000 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  3%  1%  80%  77%  13%  
Number of Issuers 243 16  5  9  1  1  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 1,203,339,423 366,079,697  75,090,700  2,692,826,557  212,587,200  265,000,000  
            
Forest Products 16,132,087,784 0 0% 4,170,652,574 26% 741,000,000 5% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  9%  2%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 26 0  12  1  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 620,464,915 0  347,554,381  741,000,000  0  0  
            
Life Sciences 23,610,856,034 649,974,535 3% 3,800,694,741 16% 790,694,715 3% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  8%  3%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 73 5  14  2  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 323,436,384 129,994,907  271,478,196  395,347,358  0  0  
            
Mining 86,788,899,857 3,311,735,419 4% 14,134,499,089 16% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  2%  31%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 159 5  63  0  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 545,842,137 662,347,084  224,357,128  0  0  0  
            
Oil & Gas 215,994,742,984 119,689,631,290 55% 1,081,841,708 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  67%  2%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 123 113  5  0  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 1,756,054,821 1,059,200,277  216,368,342  0  0  0  
            
Real Estate 19,529,852,155 1,478,151,264 8% 1,326,068,252 7% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  1%  3%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 41 10  7  0  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 476,337,857 147,815,126  189,438,322  0  0  0  
            
Technology 47,645,213,483 269,070,389 1% 3,389,016,223 7% 2,093,755 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  7%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 128 10  24  1  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 372,228,230 26,907,039  141,209,009  2,093,755  0  0  
            
Utilities and Pipelines 37,093,240,328 15,182,154,572 41% 2,333,548,995 6% 0 0% 0 0% 958,756,562 3% 
Percent of Provincial Total  9%  5%  0%  0%  46%  
Number of Issuers 23 12  1  0  0  1  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 1,612,749,579 1,265,179,548  2,333,548,995  0  0  958,756,562  
 


















Total 5,368,501  11,663,584,126  492,615,671,302  155,565,364,310  7,553,397,474  
           
Communications and Media 0 0% 4,422,615,328 4% 39,483,604,126 39% 39,261,269,099 39% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  38%  8%  25%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  3  31  18  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  1,474,205,109  1,273,664,649  2,181,181,617  0  
           
Diversified Industries 5,368,501 0% 3,714,489,192 2% 98,129,228,392 43% 45,090,591,933 20% 825,640,138 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 100%  32%  20%  29%  11%  
Number of Issuers 1  6  155  65  3  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 5,368,501  619,081,532  633,091,796  693,701,414  275,213,379  
           
Financial Services 0 0% 441,599,500 0% 221,328,675,068 76% 36,548,892,481 12% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  4%  45%  23%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  2  193  16  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  220,799,750  1,146,780,700  2,284,305,780  0  
           
Forest Products 0 0% 0 0% 1,474,498,435 9% 9,664,093,515 60% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  6%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  4  9  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  0  368,624,609  1,073,788,168  0  
           
Life Sciences 0 0% 0 0% 15,531,840,728 66% 2,795,513,145 12% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  3%  2%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  27  25  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  0  575,253,360  111,820,526  0  
           
Mining 0 0% 125,745,595 0% 42,734,220,018 49% 14,216,044,246 16% 6,682,394,870 8% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  1%  9%  9%  88%  
Number of Issuers 0  2  68  18  3  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  62,872,798  628,444,412  789,780,236  2,227,464,957  
           
Oil & Gas 0 0% 0 0% 18,138,115,083 8% 121,232,768 0% 45,362,466 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  4%  0%  1%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  3  1  1  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  0  6,046,038,361  121,232,768  45,362,466  
           
Real Estate 0 0% 850,751,286 4% 15,347,507,736 79% 527,373,615 3% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  7%  3%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  3  19  2  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  283,583,762  807,763,565  263,686,808  0  
           
Technology 0 0% 0 0% 39,401,793,332 83% 4,093,843,825 9% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  8%  3%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  74  19  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  0  532,456,667  215,465,464  0  
           
Utilities and Pipelines 0 0% 2,076,123,294 6% 1,046,188,384 3% 3,246,509,684 9% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  18%  0%  2%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  2  3  4  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  1,038,061,647  348,729,461  811,627,421  0  
 
Table 1d – Market Capitalization of TSX Venture Exchange-Listed Issuers 




















Total $11,798,298,645 3,229,480,214  4,854,155,926  92,447,303  33,631,209  67,800,327  
            
Communications and Media 252,278,586 178,540,653 71% 37,421,916 15% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 2% 6%  1%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 29 5  14  0  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 8,699,262 35,708,131  2,672,994  0  0  0  
            
Diversified Industries 1,830,109,249 335,352,890 18% 662,249,433 36% 6,567,093 0% 1,745,268 0% 14,026,750 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 16% 10%  14%  7%  5%  21%  
Number of Issuers 335 81  111  3  3  1  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 5,463,013 4,140,159  5,966,211  2,189,031  581,756  14,026,750  
            
Financial Services 464,558,595 62,458,428 13% 68,382,674 15% 12,175,845 3% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 4% 2%  1%  13%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 81 17  25  2  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 5,735,291 3,674,025  2,735,307  6,087,923  0  0  
            
Forest Products 320,353 0 0% 320,353 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0% 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 1 0  1  0  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 320,353 0  320,353  0  0  0  
            
Life Sciences  0 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0% 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0 0  0  0  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0 0  0  0  0  0  
            
Mining  5,264,639,235 422,791,808 8% 3,156,569,789 60% 24,317,630 0% 4,924,913 0% 49,924,691 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0% 13%  65%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 918 77  584  6  1  7  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 5,734,901 5,490,803  5,405,085  4,052,938  4,924,913  7,132,099  
            
Oil & Gas 2,400,768,362 1,859,817,604 77% 288,669,785 12% 2,621,001 0% 0 0% 3,848,886 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0% 58%  6%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 282 173  89  1  0  1  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 8,513,363 10,750,391  3,243,481  2,621,001  0  3,848,886  
            
Real Estate  298,616,167 64,870,708 22% 56,050,788 19% 4,732,400 2% 26,961,028 9% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0% 2%  1%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 61 22  16  2  1  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 4,895,347 2,948,669  3,503,174  2,366,200  26,961,028  0  
            
Technology 1,571,555,021 244,047,869 16% 508,140,372 32% 9,912,211 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0% 8%  10%  11%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 324 61  139  4  1  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 4,850,478 4,000,785  3,655,686  9,912,211  0  0  
            
Utilities and Pipelines 476,762,570 45,401,504 10% 22,807,978 5% 31,351,122 7% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0% 1%  0%  34%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 10 3  4  2  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 47,676,257 15,133,835  22,807,978  15,675,561  0  0  
 





Sectoral Total Nova Scotia 
Percentage of 
Sectoral Total Ontario 
Percentage of 
Sectoral Total Quebec 
Percentage of 
Sectoral Total Saskatchewan 
Percentage of 
Sectoral Total 
Total 2,983,500  88,391,747  2,491,408,980  860,049,935  77,949,504 
          
Communications and Media 0 0% 0 0% 32,458,346 13% 3,857,670 2% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  9  1  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  0  3,606,483  3,857,670  0  
           
Diversified Industries 2,983,500 0% 0 0% 452,035,980 25% 245,833,939 13% 9,314,449 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 100%  0%  18%  29%  12%  
Number of Issuers 1  0  101  31  3  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 2,983,500  0  4,475,604  7,930,127  3,104,816  
           
Financial Services 0 0% 240,000 0% 283,592,355 61% 5,914,038 1% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  11%  1%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  1  32  4  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  240,000  8,862,261  1,478,510  0  
           
Forest Products 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  0  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  0  0  0  0  
           
Life Sciences 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  0  0  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  0  0  0  0  
           
Mining 0 0% 14,584,915 0% 1,081,717,876 21% 363,793,913 7% 47,263,288 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  17%  43%  42%  61%  
Number of Issuers 0  5  168  66  4  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  2,916,983  6,438,797  5,512,029  11,815,822  
           
Oil & Gas 0 0% 22,493,090 1% 48,113,716 2% 36,949,297 2% 537,047 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  25%  2%  4%  1%  
Number of Issuers 0  4  12  1  1  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  5,623,272  4,009,476  36,949,297  537,047  
           
Real Estate 0 0% 9,628,999 3% 97,807,176 33% 38,431,939 13% 133,127 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  11%  4%  4%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  2  13  4  1  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  4,814,500  7,523,629  9,607,985  133,127  
   
Technology 0 0% 41,444,742 3% 472,371,661 30% 153,971,407 10% 19,551,593 1% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  19%  18%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  4  78  34  2  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  10,361,186  6,056,047  4,528,571  9,775,796  
   
Utilities and Pipelines 0 0% 0 0% 7,986,004 2% 2,512,274 1% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  2  1  0  
Avg. Market Cap/Issuer 0  0  3,993,002  2,512,274  0  
 
 
Table 1e – Combined Market Capitalization of TSX- and TSX-Venture Exchange Listed Issuers 
 Total Alberta 
Percentage of 
Sectoral Total British Columbia
Percentage of 







Total $934,792,957,847 181,019,047,989  50,084,029,059  30,325,089,686  309,353,917  
          
Communications and Media 100,802,490,051 4,240,986,168 4% 7,657,819,238 8% 3,177,706,260 3% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  2%  15%  10%  0%  
Number of Issuers 96 10  20  3  0  
          
Diversified Industries 228,558,945,295 27,624,482,526 12% 7,659,950,162 3% 1,292,275,735 1% 64,880,777 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  15%  15%  4%  21%  
Number of Issuers 674 138  151  11  4  
          
Financial Services 292,876,038,480 5,919,733,584 2% 443,836,173 0% 24,247,614,857 8% 212,587,200 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  3%  1%  80%  69%  
Number of Issuers 324 33  30  11  1  
          
Forest Products 16,132,408,137 0 0% 4,170,972,927 26% 741,000,000 5% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  8%  2%  0%  
Number of Issuers 27 0  13  1  0  
          
Life Sciences 23,610,856,034 649,974,535 3% 3,800,694,741 16% 790,694,715 3% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  8%  3%  0%  
Number of Issuers 73 5  14  2  0  
          
Mining 92,053,539,092 3,734,527,227 4% 17,291,068,878 19% 24,317,630 0% 4,924,913 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  2%  35%  0%  2%  
Number of Issuers 1077 82  647  6  1  
          
Oil & Gas 218,395,511,346 121,549,448,894 56% 1,370,511,492 1% 2,621,001 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  67%  3%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 405 286  94  1  0  
          
Real Estate 19,828,468,322 1,543,021,972 8% 1,382,119,041 7% 4,732,400 0% 26,961,028 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  1%  3%  0%  9%  
Number of Issuers 102 32  23  2  1  
          
Technology 49,216,768,504 513,118,257 1% 3,897,156,595 8% 12,005,966 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  0%  8%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 452 71  163  5  0  
          
Utilities and Pipelines 37,570,002,898 15,227,556,076 41% 2,356,356,973 6% 31,351,122 0% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total  8%  5%  0%  0%  


























Total 2,131,267,817  8,352,001  11,751,975,873  495,107,080,282  156,425,414,245  7,631,346,978  
             
Communications and Media 88,397,919 0% 0 0% 4,422,615,328 4% 39,516,062,472 39% 39,265,126,769 39% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 4%  0%  38%  8%  25%  0%  
Number of Issuers 1  0  3  40  19  0  
             
Diversified Industries 765,339,760 0% 8,352,001 0% 3,714,489,192 2% 98,581,264,373 43% 45,336,425,873 20% 834,954,586 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 36%  100%  32%  20%  29%  11%  
Number of Issuers 4  2  6  256  96  6  
             
Financial Services 265,000,000 0% 0 0% 441,839,500 0% 221,612,267,423 76% 36,554,806,519 12% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 12%  0%  4%  45%  23%  0%  
Number of Issuers 1  0  3  225  20  0  
             
Forest Products 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1,474,498,435 9% 9,664,093,515 60% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  0%  6%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  0  4  9  0  
             
Life Sciences  0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 15,531,840,728 66% 2,795,513,145 12% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  3%  2%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  0  27  25  0  
             
Mining  49,924,691 0% 0 0% 140,330,511 0% 43,815,937,895 48% 14,579,838,159 16% 6,729,658,159 7% 
Percent of Provincial Total 2%  0%  1%  9%  9%  88%  
Number of Issuers 7  0  7  236  84  7  
             
Oil & Gas 3,848,886 0% 0 0% 22,493,090 0% 18,186,228,799 8% 158,182,065 0% 45,899,514 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  4%  0%  1%  
Number of Issuers 1  0  4  15  2  2  
             
Real Estate  0 0% 0 0% 860,380,286 4% 15,445,314,912 78% 565,805,555 3% 133,127 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  7%  3%  0%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  5  32  6  1  
             
Technology 0 0% 0 0% 41,444,742 0% 39,874,164,993 81% 4,247,815,231 9% 19,551,593 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 0%  0%  0%  8%  3%  0%  
Number of Issuers 0  0  4  152  53  2  
             
Utilities and Pipelines 958,756,562 0% 0 0% 2,076,123,294 6% 1,054,174,387 3% 3,249,021,958 9% 0 0% 
Percent of Provincial Total 45%  0%  18%  0%  2%  0%  
Number of Issuers 1  0  2  5  5  0  
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  Source: Raw Data from Toronto Stock Exchange (at May 31, 2003) 
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  Source: Raw Data from TSX Venture Exchange (at July 7, 2003) 
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Table 4a – Number of TSX- and TSX Venture Exchange-Listed 

























































































Table 4b – Number of TSX- and TSX Venture Exchange-Listed 






























































































Appendix C – History of the Merger of Stock Exchanges in Canada 
 
Prior to 1999, there were five stock exchanges in Canada. The four major exchanges 
included the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE), Alberta Stock Exchange (ASE), Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE, now known as TSX) and Montreal Exchange (ME). Canada’s smallest 
exchange was the Winnipeg Stock Exchange (WSE). In addition, the TSE operated an over-the-
counter trading system known as the Canadian Dealing Network (CDN). It was the exchange’s 
market for small equity trading.  
 
In 1999, Canada’s stock exchanges went through a major restructuring. The purpose was 
to create a globally competitive trading market through market specialization, increased 
liquidity, and operating cost savings. To achieve this goal, the four major exchanges entered into 
an agreement to restructure the Canadian trading markets. As a result of this agreement, the ASE, 
VSE and “parts” of the ME and TSE (specifically, the CDN) merged into a new market called 
the Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX). CDNX became Canada’s junior equities exchange 
and was centralized in Western Canada (with a head office in Calgary and another office in 
Vancouver).  The TSE became the sole senior equities exchange in Canada.181 The ME became 
the exchange for derivatives trading.182An invitation was extended to the WSE to participate in 
the new junior market.  
 
In 2000, several developments occurred in respect of the restructuring of the Canadian 
capital markets: the WSE merged with CDNX and became a regional office, and CDNX opened 
an office in Toronto.  
 
By 2001, the TSE purchased CDNX and began operating it as a subsidiary that continued 
to service the junior venture capital market. This development brought all of Canada’s equity 
trading under one roof.183 CDNX’s head office remained in Calgary, and operational branches 
were located in Vancouver, Toronto, Winnipeg and Montreal. 
 
In 2002, the Toronto Stock Exchange Inc. changed the logo of the exchange from 
“TSE” to “TSX”. As well, the CDNX became the TSX Venture Exchange and continues to trade 
junior equities.  
 
Currently, the TSX Group of companies – TSX, TSX Venture Exchange and TSX 
Markets (formerly TSE-CDNX Markets Inc.) – collectively manages Canada’s senior and junior 
equity markets. The TSX group of companies is headquartered in Toronto and maintains division 
offices in Montreal, Winnipeg, Calgary and Vancouver.184 
 
In the TSX Group’s submission to the Wise Persons’ Committee, it states that it plans to 
expand the TSX Venture Exchange into the Atlantic provinces.  It states: “The interest among all 
regulators in TSX Venture Exchange will almost certainly increase as we increase the national  
                                                 
181 The TSX transferred its junior equity trading to CDNX and its derivatives trading to the MSE.  
182 The MSE transferred its junior equity trading to CDNX and its senior equities trading to the TSE.  
183 See TSX Media Release, online at http://www.tse.com/en/pdf/TSXGroupOverview.pdf. 
184 See TSX website, online at http://www.tsx.ca/en/aboutus/index.html. 
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character of the exchange which, you will recall, was created out of the merger of five small, 
predominantly local and, for the most part, western Canadian stock exchanges.  Since acquiring 
the consolidated exchanges – Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX) – in 2001, we have 
expanded its operations in Ontario and Quebec.  We see further expansion ahead, both in 
Central Canada and in the Atlantic Provinces, both areas that were long under-served in terms 
of the public venture market.”185 
 
 
                                                 
185 TSX Group Inc., submission to WPC. 
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Appendix D – SEC Locations: Headquarter, Regional and District Offices186 
   
Name of Office Location Region Covered 
   
Headquarters (includes Office of 
Investor Education & Assistance) 
Washington, DC  
   
1. Northeast Regional Office New York, NY Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Virginia and West Virginia 
   
2. Pacific Regional Office Los Angeles, CA Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and 
Washington 
   
3. Southeast Regional Office Miami, FL Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, 
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virgin Islands
   
4. Midwest Regional Office Chicago, IL Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming 
   
5. Atlanta District Office Atlanta, GA  
   
6. Forth Worth District Office Fort Worth, TX  
   
7. Salt Lake District Office Salt Lake City, UT  
   
8. San Francisco District Office San Francisco, CA  
   
9. Boston District Office Boston, MA  
   
10. Philadelphia District Office Philadelphia, PA  
 
                                                 
186 SEC Addresses: Headquarters, Regional, and District Offices, online at http://www.sec.gov/contact/addresses.htm. 
